



## OBTAINING E-EVIDENCE WHEN INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING CRIMES

ONLINE INVESTIGATIONS: WEBSITES AND  
SOCIAL MEDIA

Prague, 18-19 October 2021

**UP  
GRADE**  
YOUR LEGAL  
EXPERTISE

**Criminal  
Law**



### Speakers and chairs

**Patricia Ayodeji**, Dual-Qualified Solicitor for England & Wales,  
Lawyer (Abogado) for Spain, Barcelona

**Steven David Brown**, International Cybercrime Consultant, Vienna

**Laviero Buono**, Head of Section for European Criminal Law,  
ERA, Trier

**Muthupandi Ganesan**, Barrister at Law & Partner, Aliant Law,  
London

**Petar Majic**, Digital Forensic Consultant, INsig2, Zagreb

**Joachim Meese**, Professor, Criminal Law and Procedure,  
University of Antwerp; Attorney, Bar of Ghent

**Dennis Pielken**, Lecturer, Cybercrime & Digital Investigations,  
Rhineland-Palatinate Police University

**Claudia Pina**, Investigating Judge (JLD), SNE, Operations  
Department – Casework Unit; Coordinator of the European Judicial  
Cybercrime Network (EJCN) Support Team, The Hague

**John Van Krieken**, Judge, Court of Appeal, Tilburg

**Renata Vystrčilová**, Head of Department, Czech Judicial  
Academy, Kroměříž

**Pavel Zeman**, Prosecutor, Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office,  
Brno

### Key topics

- Online investigations on websites
- Investigating social media (open and covert)
- Demonstration of a forensic tool
- e-Evidence and the admissibility test

Language  
English

Event number  
321DT34f

Organisers  
ERA (Laviero Buono) in cooperation with  
the Czech Judicial Academy



Co-funded by the Justice Programme of the  
European Union (2014-2020)

# OBTAINING E-EVIDENCE WHEN INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING CRIMES

## Monday, 18 October 2021

08:30 Arrival and registration of participants

09:00 **Welcome and introduction to the programme**  
*Renata Vystrčilová & Laviero Buono*

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### PART I: TECHNICAL ISSUES AND BASIC UNDERSTANDING OF INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND CONCEPTS

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*Chair: Laviero Buono*

09:15 **The Internet: More than an IoTa of evidence**

- More than the WWW (a brief introduction to the Internet)
- Internet history and the cache
- Browser profiling
- Evidence and the Internet of things (IoT)
- Sources and resources
- Kept in the Dork (ways to focus your search strategy)
- Social media: the publisher -v- platform debate

*Steven David Brown*

10:15 Discussion

10:30 Break

*Chair: Joachim Meese*

11:00 **Open source tools, computer forensics in the “Cloud”**

- Encryption
- Reverse image search
- How to review a webpage or site that is offline
- Physical and logical acquisition of data
- Cloud providers and replicated data on websites and social media

*Petar Majic*

11:45 **Open Source Intelligence and social media: finding the needle in Facebook, Instagram and others**  
*Dennis Pielken*

12:30 Discussion

12:45 Lunch

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### PART II: LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO THE COLLECTION AND THE PRESENTATION OF E-EVIDENCE IN COURT

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*Chair: Steven David Brown*

14:00 **Websites and social media: the legal challenges of dealing with electronic evidence in criminal proceedings**

- Principles of dealing with electronic evidence
- Common procedures for recognising and handling evidence on digital devices
- International investigations (search and seizure – obtaining evidence from the Internet, admissibility)
- the challenges in finding the evidence on websites and social media

*Joachim Meese*

14:45 Discussion

15:00 Break

## Objective

The main objective of this seminar is to train EU legal practitioners on the fundamentals of electronic evidence enabling them to gain an overview of the complex challenges related to criminal cases with tech/internet components. This event will address online investigations with particular focus on searches on websites and social media platforms.

## About the Project

This seminar is part of a large-scale project sponsored by the European Commission entitled “Obtaining e-evidence when investigating and prosecuting crimes”. It consists of six seminars planned to take place in Dublin, Thessaloniki, Prague, Trier, Cracow and Vilnius.

## Who should attend?

Judges, prosecutors and lawyers in private practice from EU Member States (UK and Denmark do not participate in the Justice Programme 2014-2020).

## Venue

Judicial complex (Justiční areál)  
Na Míčáncích, 28. pluku  
1533/29b, Prague 10 (Praha 10)

## CPD

ERA's programmes meet the standard requirements for recognition as Continuing Professional Development (CPD). This event corresponds to **8.5 CPD hours**.

## Your contact persons



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Head of Section  
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Assistant  
Tel.: +49(0)651 9 37 37 322  
E-Mail: [Egreenwood@era.int](mailto:Egreenwood@era.int)

Chair: *Laviero Buono*

15:30 **Social media and electronic evidence**

*How social media networks yield digital evidence of the planning and commission of crimes, and assisted in cyber investigations resulting in the creation of solid cases against the defendants or their acquittals. Presentation of various cases involving Facebook, Twitter, Whatsapp et al.*

*Patricia Ayodeji*

16:30 Discussion

16:45 End of the first day

19:00 Dinner

## Tuesday, 19 October 2021

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### PART III: ONLINE INVESTIGATIONS AND HANDLING OF E-EVIDENCE – BEST PRACTICES

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Chair: *Patricia Ayodeji*

09:30 **Computer forensics and electronic evidence in court: issues of authenticity, reliability and credibility with particular reference to data extracted from social media platforms**

*John Van Krieken*

10.00 Discussion

10:15 **Online investigations and the challenges for the defence**

*Muthupandi Ganesan*

10:45 Discussion

11:00 Break

Chair: *Laviero Buono*

11:30 **Handling electronic evidence in courts**

- The importance of the chain of custody in handling evidence
- Trial considerations: methods of presentation and admissibility tests

*Claudia Pina*

12:00 **E-evidence gathering in the Czech Republic: theory and practice**

*Pavel Zeman*

12:30 Discussion

12:45 End of seminar and light lunch

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For programme updates: [www.era.int](http://www.era.int)

Programme may be subject to amendment.



This programme has been produced with the financial support of the Justice Programme 2014-2020 of the European Union.

The content of this programme reflects only ERA's view and the Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.

# Seminar

## Obtaining e-evidence when investigating and prosecuting crimes

18-19 October 2021 / Event number: 321DT34f/eg



Europäische Rechtsakademie  
Academy of European Law  
Académie de Droit Européen  
Accademia di Diritto Europeo

Apply for  
“Obtaining e-evidence  
when investigating and  
prosecuting crimes”:  
[www.era.int/?130868&en](http://www.era.int/?130868&en)



### Language

English

### Venue

Judicial complex (Justiční areál)  
Na Míčánkách, 28. pluku  
1533/29b, Prague 10 (Praha 10)

### Contact Person

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Assistant  
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+49 651 9 37 37 - 322

## Terms and conditions of participation

### Selection

1. Participation is only open to judges, prosecutors and lawyers in private practice from eligible EU Member States.
2. The number of places available is limited (30 places). Participation will be subject to a selection procedure.
3. Applications should be submitted before **30 September 2021**.
4. A response will be sent to every applicant after this deadline.  
**We advise you not to book any travel or hotel before you receive our confirmation.**

### Registration Fee

5. €225 including documentation, lunches and dinner.

### Travel expenses

6. Travel costs up to €300 (if your place of work is more than 100km from the venue) can be reimbursed by ERA upon receipt of the original receipts, tickets, boarding passes, invoices after the seminar. Participants are asked to book their own travel and accommodation. These rules do not apply to representatives of EU Institutions and Agencies who are supposed to cover their own travel and accommodation. Participants are advised of the obligation to use the most cost-efficient mode of transport available.

### Accommodation

7. Maximum 2 hotel nights can be reimbursed by ERA, only upon receipt of the original hotel invoice, up to €155.00 per night including breakfast, if your place of work is more than 100km from the venue.

### Other services

8. Two lunches, beverages consumed during the event and the seminar documents are offered by ERA. One joint conference dinner is also included.

### Participation

9. Participation at the whole conference is required and your presence will be recorded.
10. A list of participants including each participant's address will be made available to all participants unless the ERA receives written objection from the participant no later than one week prior to the beginning of the event.
11. The participant's address and other relevant information will be stored in ERA's database in order to provide information about future ERA events, publications and/or other developments in the participant's area of interest unless the participant indicates that he or she does not wish ERA to do so. A certificate of attendance will be distributed at the end of the conference.



Academy of  
European Law



Co-funded by the  
Justice Programme  
of the  
European Union  
2014-2020



Czech Republic  
Judicial Academy

# The Internet: More than an IOTA of Evidence

Steven David Brown

Prague  
18-19 October 2021

**Must prove:**

**Which device used in the offence.**

**Who was using it at the relevant time.  
(traditional forensics may also help)**

**Please note:  
Information has been simplified to make it easier to  
understand and remember**

**Identifiers have been redacted**


# What is the Internet ?

**Internet**, a system architecture that has revolutionized communications and methods of commerce by allowing various computer networks around the world to interconnect. Sometimes referred to as a "network of networks"

<https://www.britannica.com/technology/Internet>

**World Wide Web** (WWW) [...] the leading information retrieval service of the Internet (the worldwide computer network). The Web gives users access to a vast array of documents that are connected to each other by means of hypertext or hypermedia links—i.e., hyperlinks, electronic connections that link related pieces of information in order to allow a user easy access to them.

<https://www.britannica.com/topic/World-Wide-Web>



## Data, data everywhere

**4.66 billion active internet users** worldwide  
= 59.5 % global population.  
(Jan 2021)

**92.6 percent** (4.32 billion) access internet **via mobile devices.**

<https://www.statista.com/statistics/617136/digital-population-worldwide/>



**WWW** contains **at least 4.13 billion pages**  
( July 2021)


<https://www.worldwidewebsize.com/>

**2.5 quintillion bytes of data created daily**  
(90% world's data created in the last two years).


<https://www.the-next-tech.com/blockchain-technology/how-much-data-is-produced-every-day-2019/>

A quintillion = 1 followed by 18 zeros  
**2,500,000,000,000,000,000 bytes per day**





**All devices on internal private network connect to ISP through router.  
ISP assigns IP address**



**User connects to router/accesspoint  
Router assigns internal IP address to User  
User's external IP address same as Router**

**Assigned by  
Internet Service Provider  
(ISP)**

**Addresses  
Allocated  
Geographically**

**(Public)  
Internet Protocol  
(IP) Address**

**Static -v- Dynamic**

**Your address on  
the Internet**

**ISP holds  
subscriber  
addresses**



**Two kinds of IP Address:**

**IPv4     195.243.153.54 = www.era.int**

**4,294,967,296 possible IPv4 addresses**

**4.66 billion active internet users worldwide (i.e.  
not enough!)**

**IPv6**

**2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334**

**8 sets of 4 hexadecimal digits (hexadecimal =  
base<sub>16</sub> numbers)**

**340 undecillion possible IPv6 addresses**



**More than enough for everyone**

**“You can find a suspect or victim  
through the IP Address”**

**Who thinks  
‘Yes’?**

**‘Yes’ ... ‘but’**

- **Use of public wifi Access Point  
(bar/hotel/airport/library)**
- **Use of unsecure domestic wifi router**
- **Carrier Grade NAT** (Network Address Translation)
- **Proxy Servers**
- **VPNs**
- **Anonymisers like TOR**

# Proxy server (Bullet-proof)

The collage features two overlapping web pages. The top-left page is the 'BulletProof Web' website, which advertises 'bulletproof hosting' and lists servers in various countries: Ukraine, Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, and Moldova. It includes a 'LIVE CHAT' button and a 'Write us:' section. The bottom-right page is 'HOSTINGS.INFO', a review site for hosting services. It features a search bar, a list of hosting providers with their ratings (e.g., Infomaniak.com with a 4.0 rating), and a 'CHOOSE PRICING PLAN' button. The text on the Hostings.info page explains that 'BulletProof (DMCA ignored) hosting' allows users to upload any kind of content, even if it's usually restricted by regular hosting providers.

The collage shows two overlapping browser windows. The top-left window displays the 'Settings' page for a VPN service, with a 'VPN' toggle set to 'On'. A blue notification box is overlaid on the settings, stating: 'VPN: Browse with VPN to prevent third parties from tracking you. Your connection speed might be affected. I understand. Don't show again'. The top-right window shows the 'Epic Privacy Browser' interface, with a 'how this works - please read' dialog box open. The dialog box has a green 'On' button and an 'Off' button. Below the buttons is a 'Select Country' dropdown menu with options: US East Coast (default), US West Coast, Canada, UK, and Germany.

# VPN Virtual Private Network Proxy server with data encryption

# What is my IP address location?

YOUR IP ADDRESS

84.XX.XXX.XX

Your IP address is currently exposed. Start reclaiming your online anonymity with a VPN.

[Keep your IP address private](#)

LOCATION

Austria - Vienna

INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER (ISP)

ISP Redacted



(IP Addresses assigned regionally)

# What is my IP address location?


YOUR EXPRESSVPN IP ADDRESS

180.149.241.182

Your IP address is secured. Websites cannot use it to identify you.

LOCATION

India - Mumbai - 1



Need help? Chat with us!

No central control


All websites end with  
.onion

Can be used to  
access DarkNet

# TOR The Onion Router

Peer to Peer Network  
(people volunteer part of  
their hard drive)

'Anonymising technology'  
(there are others)



TOR

The Darknet

Search

Matching any words Matching all words

Searching 999,535 documents

Advertise now in Torch. Click here.

BUY REAL MONEY

The Real Hidden Wiki since 2014

TorLinks CLICK HERE

TOR SCAM LIST


SEXY GIRLS MONEY LUXARI CARS

TORBUY


暗网中文指南

BLACK MARKET 40+ sellers

InZeit Excellence in Acuity



InZeit Excellence in Acuity



**Each packet sent separately  
(take different route) to  
destination**

```

Administrator: Command Prompt
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.19042.1083]
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\WINDOWS\system32>tracert era.int

Tracing route to era.int [195.243.153.54]
over a maximum of 30 hops:


  0  0 ms   0 ms   0 ms   192.168.0.1
  1  3 ms   3 ms   4 ms   compalhub.home [192.168.0.1]
  2  23 ms  23 ms  13 ms  217-15-100-1.static.upcbusiness.at [217.15.100.1]
  3  14 ms  15 ms  15 ms  217-15-100-252.static.upcbusiness.at [217.15.100.252]
  4  15 ms  14 ms  20 ms  80.157.204.97
  5  35 ms  34 ms  35 ms  p5b17f691.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [91.23.246.145]
  6  35 ms  33 ms  35 ms  87.190.102.6
  7  33 ms  31 ms  32 ms  195.243.153.54

Trace complete.


C:\WINDOWS\system32>
  
```

**7 Hops**


C:\WINDOWS\system32> tracert [website address]



**Packet contains metadata:  
Source/destination IP  
addresses  
Where packet fits in the  
sequence**



**On arrival, packets  
reassembled  
Replacements requested for  
missing or damaged  
(‘corrupted’) packets**




**Internet connection is dynamic  
(Data swapped both sides)**



**Try it yourself:  
[clickclickclick.click](http://clickclickclick.click)**

**IP Address  
gets you to  
the  
network.**

**How do you  
know which  
device on  
the  
network?**



## Identifying a Device on Network

**MAC (Media Access Control)  
address**

**On mobile device (phone):**

**IMEI number**  
(International Mobile Equipment Identity)

**IMSI number**  
(International Mobile Subscriber Identity)

**Identifies a device on a  
private network**

**Burnt into Network  
Interface Card (hardware  
that connects to Internet)**

**IMEI hardcoded into phone  
by manufacturer**

**Dial \*#06#**

**Can be used to blacklist**


**IMSI number hardcoded  
into SIM card**

**Identifies SIM to phone  
porvider**



## How to find your MAC Address (in Windows)

1. RClick on windows icon bottom left of screen
2. Open search & type **cmd.exe** into search window
3. Click on open cmd.exe.
4. A black window will open with the title 'Command Prompt'
5. Type: **ipconfig /all**
6. Look for the physical address




```
C:\Users\>ipconfig /all

Wireless LAN adapter Local Area Connection* 1:

    Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix . . . . . :
    Description . . . . . : Microsoft Wi-Fi Direct Virtual Adapter
    Physical Address. . . . . : 0C-54-00-00-00-00
    DHCP Enabled. . . . . : Yes
    Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . . . : Yes
```



## Spoofing MAC Address



**Technitium MAC Address Changer v6 - by Shreyas Zare**

File Action Options Help

Network Connections	Changed	MAC Address	Link Status	Speed
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Local Area Connection	No	00-00-00-00-00-00	Up, Non Operational	0 bps
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ethernet (Kernel Debugger)	No	00-00-00-00-00-00	Down, Non Operational	0 bps
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WiFi	Yes	02-14-28-6A-B9-54	Up, Non Operational	0 bps
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Local Area Connection* 1	Yes	02-14-28-6A-B9-54	Up, Non Operational	0 bps

Information | IP Address | Presets |

Connection Details

**Connection** WiFi

**Device** Intel(R) Dual Band Wireless-AC 8265

**Hardware ID** PCI\VEN\_8086\DEV\_095A\SUBSYS\_095A01010808\0000000000000000

**Config ID** {B3AAC832-37D1-4140-8000-000000000000}

**TCP/IPv4:** Enabled **TCP/IPv6:** Enabled

**Original MAC Address**  
0C-54-00-00-00-00  
Intel Corporate (Address: Lot 8, Jalan Hi-Tech 2/3)

**Active MAC Address**  
02-14-28-6A-B9-54 (Changed)  
Unknown Vendor

Change MAC Address

Random MAC Address

Automatically restart network connection to apply changes

Make new MAC address persistent

Use '02' as first octet of MAC address [Why?](#)

Change Now! Restore Original

Received 16.5 --Speed 0 B/s  
Sent 948 --Speed 128

Received 0 byte (0 bytes) --Speed 0 B/s (0 bytes)  
Sent 0 byte (0 bytes) --Speed 0 B/s (0 bytes)

### Technitium MAC Address Changer

A freeware utility to spoof MAC address instantly



**Moral of the story:**

**Can't take anything for granted**

**(fortunately most crooks not so sophisticated)**

**All you need is logs**

All **In Browser**  Clear browsing data

Recent

<input type="checkbox"/>	 Money Laundering - Overview, How It Works, Example	corporatefinanceinstitute.com	10:37	✕
<input type="checkbox"/>	 An Idiot's Guide to Money Laundering   Global Witness	www.globalwitness.org	10:37	✕
<input type="checkbox"/>	 How Money Laundering Works   HowStuffWorks	money.howstuffworks.com	10:37	✕
<input type="checkbox"/>	 Top 5 Unconventional Ways to Launder Money	www.trulioo.com	10:37	✕
<input type="checkbox"/>	 How Do Drug Dealers Launder Money? - Tookitaki	www.tookitaki.com	10:37	✕
<input type="checkbox"/>	 Beginner's Guide to Money Laundering	www.businessinsider.com	10:37	✕
<input type="checkbox"/>	 how can I launder my cash? - Google Search	www.google.co.uk	10:37	✕
<input type="checkbox"/>	 Money Laundering 101: Understanding the Basics - IP Services Inc	www.ip-services.com	10:36	✕
<input type="checkbox"/>	 money laundering 101 - Google Search	www.google.co.uk	10:36	✕
<input type="checkbox"/>	 Google	www.google.co.uk	10:36	✕

**edge://history/all**

Edge | edge://settings/siteData **cookies**

COVID Registrierung




Settings

Search settings

- Profiles
- Privacy, search, and services
- Appearance
- On start-up
- New tab page
- Share, copy, and paste
- Cookies and site permissions**
- Default browser
- Downloads
- Family safety
- Languages
- Printers
- System
- Reset settings
- Phone and other devices
- About Microsoft Edge

Cookies and data stored for sites you have browsed

Sort by: Name Filter by: All

 a-mo.net	0 bytes • 2 cookies	^
 a-mo.net	0 bytes • 1 cookie	> ✕
 prebid.a-mo.net	0 bytes • 1 cookie	> ✕
 admatic.com.tr	72 bytes • 2 cookies	^
 ads3.admatic.com.tr	0 bytes • 1 cookie	> ✕
 ads4.admatic.com.tr	0 bytes • 1 cookie	> ✕
 cdn.admatic.com.tr	72 bytes • 0 cookies	> ✕
 adtarget.com.tr	0 bytes • 3 cookies	^
 console.adtarget.com.tr	0 bytes • 3 cookies	> ✕
 ctnsnet.com	0 bytes • 1 cookie	^

**edge://settings/siteData**

Information about the Network Cache Storage Service

**memory**

- Number of entries: 452
- Maximum storage size: 32768 KiB
- Storage in use: 11766 KiB
- Storage disk location: none, only stored in memory
- [List Cache Entries](#)

**disk**

- Number of entries: 1418
- Maximum storage size: 1048576 KiB
- Storage in use: 20005 KiB
- Storage disk location: C:\Users\steve\AppData\Local\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\041gg9rc.default-1466439770768\cache2
- [List Cache Entries](#)

**appcache**

- Number of entries: 0
- Maximum storage size: 0 KiB
- Storage in use: 0 KiB
- Storage disk location: none, only stored in memory

# about:cache (Firefox)



## about:cache?storage=memory

URL	Size	Count	Expires	Expires
<a href="https://www.fake-id.com/assets/bower_components/novel/css/novel.min.css">https://www.fake-id.com/assets/bower_components/novel/css/novel.min.css</a>	6974 bytes	1	2021-07-16 17:25:53	2022-07-16 17:25:51
O^privateBrowsingId=1&partitionKey=%28https%2Cfake-id.com%29,p,				
HEAD:https://www.fake-id.com/assets/images/flags/active/en-off@2x.png	0 bytes	1	2021-07-16 17:25:54	Expired Immediately
O^privateBrowsingId=1&partitionKey=%28https%2Cfake-id.com%29,p,				
<a href="https://www.fake-id.com/assets/front/fonts/ProximaNova-Regular.woff?v=4.5.0">https://www.fake-id.com/assets/front/fonts/ProximaNova-Regular.woff?v=4.5.0</a>	40228 bytes	1	2021-07-16 17:25:53	2021-08-15 17:25:52
O^privateBrowsingId=1&partitionKey=%28https%2Cfake-id.com%29,p,			17:25:53	17:25:53
<a href="https://www.fake-id.com/assets/front/js/viewportchecker.js">https://www.fake-id.com/assets/front/js/viewportchecker.js</a>	444 bytes	1	2021-07-16 17:25:53	2022-07-16 17:25:51
O^privateBrowsingId=1&partitionKey=%28https%2Cfake-id.com%29,p,				
<a href="https://www.fake-id.com/assets/images/flags/br-off.png">https://www.fake-id.com/assets/images/flags/br-off.png</a>	1871 bytes	1	2021-07-16 17:25:53	2021-08-15 17:25:52
O^privateBrowsingId=1&partitionKey=%28https%2Cfake-id.com%29,p,				
<a href="https://www.fake-id.com/assets/front/css/owl.theme.default.min.css">https://www.fake-id.com/assets/front/css/owl.theme.default.min.css</a>	392 bytes	1	2021-07-16 17:25:52	2022-07-16 17:25:52
O^privateBrowsingId=1&partitionKey=%28https%2Cfake-id.com%29,p,				
O^privateBrowsingId=1&partitionKey=%28https%2Cfake-id.com%29,p,	0 bytes	1	17:25:54	Immediately
HEAD:https://www.fake-id.com/assets/images/createId-carousel-img3@2x.jpg	0 bytes	1	2021-07-16 17:25:54	2021-08-15 17:25:54
O^privateBrowsingId=1&partitionKey=%28https%2Cfake-id.com%29,p,				
<a href="https://www.fake-id.com/assets/images/flags/it-off.png">https://www.fake-id.com/assets/images/flags/it-off.png</a>	1710 bytes	1	2021-07-16 17:25:53	2021-08-15 17:25:52
O^privateBrowsingId=1&partitionKey=%28https%2Cfake-id.com%29,p,				
HEAD:https://www.fake-id.com/assets/images/flags/it-off@2x.png	0 bytes	1	2021-07-16 17:25:54	Expired Immediately
O^privateBrowsingId=1&partitionKey=%28https%2Cfake-id.com%29,p,				
HEAD:https://www.fake-id.com/assets/images/handbookCircleImg2@2x.png	0 bytes	1	2021-07-16 17:25:54	2021-08-15 17:25:54
O^privateBrowsingId=1&partitionKey=%28https%2Cfake-id.com%29,p,				



**Mohammed Ali –Computer Programmer  
Father of two, Bolton, UK  
2015 ordered enough ricin on Dark Web to kill 700 -  
1,400 people**

**Username weirdo0000**

**500 mg for 2.1849 BTC  
(then = GBP320 those were the days!!!!!!)**

**Encrypted chats discussed with seller:**

- the price of a lethal dose,
- discounts for bulk orders and repeat purchases
- ricin's shelf life

**Asked: "How do I test this ricin?"**

**Reply: "You must test it on a rodent."**



**Investigators found on Ali's Computer notepad:  
To do "paid ricin guy" and "get pet to murder"**

**Searches for chinchillas, animal rescue centres, rabbits  
and "pocket-sized pets"**

**Google searches:**

**"abrin v ricin"**

**"home made cyanide and ricin"**

**"hydrogen peroxide"**

**On LG Nexus smartphone searched Yahoo for:**

**"what poison kills you quick, is foolproof, easily  
found/made, easily concealed and hard to detect post  
mortem"**



<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/sep/18/breaking-bad-fan-jailed-over-ricin-plot>


**Cookies, search history and device configuration create a characteristic 'browser fingerprint'**

**Try this out:**

**<https://webkey.robinlinus.com/>**



**Commercial value – profile used by Data Brokers for targeted online advertising.**



**'In 2017, both **Alphabet** (Google's parent company) and **Facebook** made an overwhelming majority of their **total profits** through digital advertising—**88%** and **97%**, respectively.'**



<https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-privacy-how-data-brokers-find-and-sell-your-personal-info.html>

**EFF**

# COVER YOUR TRACKS

See how trackers view your browser

Test your browser to see how well you are protected from tracking and fingerprinting:

**TEST YOUR BROWSER**

Test with a real tracking company?

How does tracking technology...

## Your Results

Your browser fingerprint **appears to be unique** among the 250,064 tested in the past 45 days.

Currently, we estimate that your browser has a fingerprint that conveys **at least 17.93 bits of identifying information**.

The measurements we used to obtain this result are listed below. You can [read more about our methodology, statistical results, and some defenses against fingerprinting here](#).

**Browser Fingerprinting**  
<https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/>

## Browser fingerprint can also be faked:

Firefox Browser  
**ADD-ONS** Explore Extensions Themes More... v

Extension Workshop Developer Hub Register or log in

Find add-ons

**User-Agent Switcher and Manager**  
 by Ray

SpooF websites trying to gather information about your web navigation—like your browser type and operating system—to deliver distinct content you may not want.



Recommended

Remove

70,032 Users 423 Reviews 4.3 Stars

5 ★	293
4 ★	56
3 ★	27
2 ★	16
1 ★	31


## Browser fingerprint can also be faked:



**Data is elsewhere**

**In more than one country, moved  
from one to another**

**Cloud service may not know where it is at a given time**



<https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/en/publications/practical-guide/practical-guide.html>



***Free download for staff of criminal justice authorities***



## **Internet of Things**

**Estimated 22 billion -50 billion devices**



**All connected**




**All generating & logging data**





Masarykovo nám. 183/15  
Kroměříž  
767 01

**RClick**



**GPS  
Coordinates**





geocode:49.297632,17.389881,0.5km

Search radius

# Geofence Warrants & Google's Sensorvault

## Who has an Android phone?

**72.84% Android Global Market Share**  
(June 2021) [statista.com](https://www.statista.com)

Location data saved to  
**'Sensorvault'** database

## **Milwaukee USA June 2017**

**Middle of the night  
Woman car jacked by 2 males**

**One drove, the other raped her. They also stole her purse.**

**Victim saw the driver using **google maps** on his Smart Phone  
near General Mitchell International Airport**

**(Shortly before the carjacking another woman reported to police  
being harassed by two men (one with baseball bat))**

**Geofence Warrant sought & obtained within 12 hours  
Forwarded to Google with "exigent circumstances"**

**20 minutes later Google called back**



**Google assisted in refining the search, linking it to different  
locations linked to the attack**

**Next night suspect used victim's credit card in a bar**

**Only one phone matched the searches. Subscriber had previous  
conviction for 'unlawful imprisonment'**

**Police asked telecoms provider (T-Mobile) to track phone in real  
time.**

**Located in Kentucky. Kentucky police arrested suspect after  
chase. Identified second suspect.**

**5 Days from crime report to arrest.**



<https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/she-didn-t-know-her-kidnapper-he-was-using-google-n1252472>

## Issues:

### Privacy


Users 'give permission' for their phones to be tracked  
The data exists, but is **anonymised**  
Google acts as gatekeeper.

### 'Blunt instrument'

**Catches innocent bystanders**, but Google vets data  
before divulging to police

**March 2020 Cyclist wrongly linked to a burglary  
because of fitness tracker on phone**

<https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/7/21169533/florida-google-runkeeper-geofence-police-privacy>



**Shodan.io**

<https://www.cybrary.it/video/shodan-demo/>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ty2cUeiAcdY>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v2EdwgX72PQ>



Explore

shodan.io/explore

SHODAN Explore Downloads Pricing Search Account

// TOP VOTED

**Webcam**  
best ip cam search I have found yet.  
12,519 webcam surveillance cams

**Cams**  
admin admin  
5,290 cam webcam

**Netcam**  
Netcam  
2,697 netcam

**default password**  
Finds results with "default password" in the ban.  
2,111 router default password

// RECENTLY SHARED

**Seagate.com**  
1 its

**80**  
1

**Saferoads Variable Message Signs**  
Electronic highway message signs  
2 iot signs

**ADB Remote Access**  
3 sub port 5555

// FILTERS

Search shared queries...

**Popular Tags**

webcam cam camera ip router scada ftp  
server http iot test password cisco web  
default login ssh 1 nas ipcam

**Shodan 2000**  
Explore the Internet in style using an 80's retro-futuristic interface to synthwave music.  
2000.SHODAN.IO

Internet Observatory

shodan.io/search?query=Server%3A+SQ-WEBCAM

SHODAN Explore Downloads Pricing Server: SQ-WEBCAM

TOTAL RESULTS  
2,086

TOP COUNTRIES

Switzerland  
Romania  
Russian Federation  
Canada  
Poland  
More...

TOP PORTS

80  
81  
443  
52089  
7547  
More...

TOP ORGANIZATIONS

Swisscom (Schweiz) AG  
RCS & RDS Business  
Softline Trade JSC  
Amazon Data Services Canada  
DigitalOcean, LLC  
More...

TOTAL RESULTS  
2,086

TOP COUNTRIES

Country	Count
Switzerland	1,279
Romania	630
Russian Federation	77
Canada	23
Poland	12

View Report View on Map

**New Service: Keep track of what you have connected to the Internet**

**5.187.151.118**  
05BB9778.catv.pool.telekom.hu  
Magyar Telekom plc.  
Hungary, Budapest  
HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Connection: close  
Cache-Control: no-cache  
Server: SQ-WEBCAM  
CONTENT-LENGTH: 944

**99.79.27.147**  
ec2-99-79-27-147.ca-central-1.compute.amazonaws.com  
Amazon Data Services Canada  
Canada, Montréal  
cloud honeypot

**35.182.177.194**

Softline Trade JSC  
Russian Federation, Moscow  
HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Server: 368 web server, 792/71644 HTTP Server version 2.0 - TELDAT S.A., AIN6/1.00, ADB Broadband HTTP Server, ADH-Web, AB, ASUSTek UPnP/1.0 PlusUPnP/1.4, AT5/5.3.0, Adapter ASH 1.1, AiTiAs/ASP 1.0 UPnP/1.0 MiniUPnP/

InZeit  
Excellence in Anality

## A few 'things'



### Faking evidence with a bodycam

- **Officer Richard Pinheiro (Baltimore police)**
- **30 sec pre-activation recording**
- **Video shows**
  - **hiding drugs**
  - **walking away**
  - **returning to 'find' drugs**
- **Claimed restaging a legitimate find 'for the camera'**
- **Sentenced to prison terms of 3 years (suspended), 2 years probation, 300 hours community service.**



VIDEO:

<https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-ci-body-camera-footage-20170719-story.html>



**Dunstable, UK, 2021**

**01:00AM Luke Exelby watching TV in bed with his wife**

**Smart doorbell sends alert to his phone someone trying to break-in.**

**Intruder fled by time Luke got down stairs.**

**Luke contacted the police, who sent a forensics team.**

**Smart doorbell footage saved to remote server Footage shared with police**

*"Because we got a picture of the person's face, and exactly where he put his hands on the door, they had his fingerprints. They could link his face and his fingerprints to the burglaries around the corner. They caught him straight away."*



This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-SA-NC

**Smart doorbell**



**2017 Suffolk County UK, Smart doorbell recorded prolific burglar trying to break into a house.**

**Owner was away, but phone alert meant she watched it happening. Clear image led to his arrest and guilty plea.**

**Ring (smart doorbell manufacturer) donated doorbells to Suffolk Constabulary to distribute in areas of high crime.**

**January 2021 , Corey Rice, 19, pleaded guilty at Sheffield Crown Court to wounding, attempted robbery and possession of a blade. Recorded stabbing a man on his doorstep trying to steal gold bracelet.**



<https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2021/jun/26/i-spy-are-smart-doorbells-creating-a-global-surveillance-network>



This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-SA-NC

## **Beat Nick**

**Ohio September 2016 Ross Compton (59)**

**'Awoke from sleep `to see his house on fire  
He packed his bags, grabbed his computer, broke the bedroom  
window with his cane, threw out his belongings**

**Climbed out and dragged them to his car.**

**The fire caused US\$ 400K damage and killed the cat**



<https://www.wired.com/story/your-own-pacemaker-can-now-testify-against-you-in-court/>

**Quite a feat  
– Compton was fitted with an external heart  
pump**

**Fire investigators found fire started in  
multiple places and smelt of gasoline**

**Police obtained a search warrant and downloaded the records  
from his pacemaker as well as historical records from the  
hospital**

**Charged with arson and attempted insurance fraud. Compton  
died in hospital awaiting trial.**

This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under [CC BY-SA-NC](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/)



<https://www.wired.com/story/your-own-pacemaker-can-now-testify-against-you-in-court/>

## **Fitbit**

**8 September 2018 Santa Clara, California  
Karen Navarra (67) didn't turn up for work.**

**She's found slumped in a chair at her dining table,  
large kitchen knife in her hand, her throat slit twice  
and head wounds from a blunt instrument.**

**The throat wounds were post-mortem**



<https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/Murder-defendant-dies-A-Fitbit-device-linked-14432677.php>



**Her fitbit showed a spike in her heart rate at 15:20, then  
her heart rate slowed and stopped at 15:28**

**Her stepfather, Tony Aiello (90) said he'd passed by to  
bring her a pizza and left after 15 minutes**

**Neighbour's CCTV showed Aiello's car at the premises at  
least between 15:12 -15:33**

**Aiello died in prison in 2019 awaiting trial for her  
murder.**



<https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/Murder-defendant-dies-A-Fitbit-device-linked-14432677.php>

## **Smart Phones & Watches**

**Caroline Crouch, Athens 11 May 2021**

**Husband said, three armed robbers broke into their house, strangled his wife in front of their baby daughter and got away with valuables and £10,000 cash**

**BUT:**

**Timings on e-devices did not match.**



<https://greekreporter.com/2021/06/18/how-police-unraveled-murder-caroline-crouch-husband/>

## **Smart Phones & Watches**

**Text argument between them on smartphones at about midnight  
Caroline had searched for a hotel**

**Caroline's smartwatch showed her asleep at 03:58 AM. At 04:05  
her heartbeat was racing. She was dead by 04:11 AM**

**3 hours earlier memory card from home's CCTV had been  
removed (husband said the robbers took it when they left)**

**Husband's smartphone app indicated movement at time he was  
supposed to be tied up by the robbers**

**18 June Husband charged with her murder after he confessed.**

<https://www.vice.com/en/article/akg7ne/caroline-crouch-husband-confesses-to-murdering-wife-as-smartwatch-data-exposes-his-cover-up>



<https://greekreporter.com/2021/06/18/how-police-unraveled-murder-caroline-crouch-husband/>

**Arkansas 2015 James Bates charged 1<sup>st</sup> Degree Murder (later dropped on prosecutor's application). Bates gave Amazon permission to share records.**

**Farmington, New Hampshire 2017 Timothy Verrill accused of murdering Christine Sullivan and Jenna Pellegrini (mistrial in 2019. Motion to dismiss charges now pending).**

**Hallandale Beach, Florida 2019 Adam Crespo charged with 2<sup>nd</sup> degree murder of girlfriend Sylvia Galva (spear pierced chest).**

**Haven't found a case where  
Alexa/Smart Speaker evidence has led  
to a conviction**

**Virtual Assistants**



This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under [CC BY-SA](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/)



## **Dilemma:**

**More and more devices capable of holding evidence**

**Do investigators seize absolutely everything??**

**Do you triage and hope you've everything you need (culpatory and ex-culpatory)?**

**Digital data overload: hours, days and weeks of specialist examination**

**Too few forensic facilities**

**Very high cost**

**Who 'carries the can' when a case goes wrong?**



# Kept in the dork

## Google search operators

Refining & focusing your searches  
(full list in links at the end)

Google may get suspicious and ask you to confirm  
you are human



**site:era.int**

Limits search to given  
website

**This AND That**

Returns pages with both  
This AND that

**This OR that**

Returns pages with either  
this or that or both

**word term -keyword**

- (minus) sign excludes  
specified keyword

**cache:webpage**

Finds (old) webpages stored in  
browser cache



# Searchterm filetype:pdf Finds file of specified type

“search term”  
– searches for exact phrase

John Doe (site:twitter.com | site:facebook.com |  
site:linkedin.com)  
Search for someone’s social media

\* Can replace a missing letter, word or phrase  
e.g. \* Doe



## intitle:dorks

Google search results for 'intitle:dorks'. The search bar contains 'intitle:dorks'. The results list several pages with 'dorks' highlighted in red boxes. An arrow labeled 'title' points to the word 'dorks' in the first result.

- <https://diedorks.de> - Translate this page  
Home Page | DIE **DORKS**  
Metapunk aus Markt! am Inn | Irgendwo zwischen Bach, Slayer und Wizo sind die DORKS zuhause und komponieren dreiste, amüsante, übermütige und mitreißende ...
- <https://www.linguee.com> - english-german - dorks -  
**do:ks** - German translation – Linguee  
Many translated example sentences containing "dorks" – German-English dictionary and search engine for German translations.
- <https://shahjerry33.medium.com> - google-dorks-hackin... -  
**Google Dorks** - Hacking's New Door | by Jerry Shah (Jerry ...  
The "Google Dorks" is a technique that uses google searches to find security holes and sensitive information that is not readily available on a website.
- <https://context.reverso.net> - übersetzung - dorks -  
**do:ks** - Deutsch Übersetzung - Englisch Beispiele | Reverso ...  
Übersetzung im Kontext von „dorks“ in Englisch-Deutsch von Reverso Context: Face it, J.C., we're dorks.

## allintitle:google dorks

Google search results for 'allintitle:google dorks'. The search bar contains 'allintitle:google dorks'. The results list several pages with 'Google Dorks' highlighted in red boxes.

- <https://gbhackers.com> - latest-google-dorks-list -  
**Google Dorks** List 2020 - A Complete Cheat Sheet - GBHackers  
Google Dorks List "Google Hacking" are mainly referred to pull the sensitive information from Google using advanced search terms to provide relevant data.
- <https://www.boxpiper.com> - posts - google-dork-list -  
**Google Dorks** List and Updated Database in 2021 - Box Piper  
5 days ago — Google Dork is a search query that we give to Google to look for more granular information and retrieve relevant information quickly. For ...
- <https://www.cybrary.it> - blog - google-dorks-easy-way... -  
**Google Dorks** An Easy Way of Hacking | Cybrary  
24 Nov 2020 — A Google Dork query, sometimes just referred to as a dork, is a search string that uses advanced search operators to find information that is ...
- <https://www.hackingloops.com> - google-dorks -  
Understanding **Google Dorks** and How Hackers Use Them  
At its core, that's exactly what Google Dorks are – a way to use the search engine to pinpoint websites that have certain flaws, vulnerabilities, and sensitive ...  
22 Mar 2021 · Uploaded by HackingLoops



## inurl:era

inurl:era

- ✓ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Era> - **Era**  
**Era - Wikipedia**  
An era is a span of time defined for the purposes of chronology or historiography, as in the regnal eras in the history of a given monarchy, a calendar era ...  
ERA · Bosporan era · Chinese era name
- ✓ <https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Era> - **Era** Translate this page  
**Era – Wikipedia**  
Die Era, auch „Spanische Ära“ genannt (lateinisch: Aera Hispanica, Abkürzung AH), ist eine Zeitrechnung, deren Epoche ein unbekanntes Ereignis aus dem Jahr ...
- ✓ <https://era.gv.at> - **ERA Portal Austria – Start**  
The Austrian online platform for the European Research Area (ERA) is a promotion initiative aiming at providing comprehensive information on the ...
- ✓ <https://www.era.int> - **Academy of European Law: ERA**  
The Academy of European Law (ERA) offers training in European law to lawyers, judges, barristers, solicitors, in-house counsel and academics.

## allinurl:era int

allinurl:era int

About 24 900 results (0,43 seconds)

- ✓ <https://www.era.int> - **Academy of European Law: ERA**  
The Academy of European Law (ERA) offers training in European law to lawyers, judges, barristers, solicitors, in-house counsel and academics.
  - ✓ **Courses**  
The Academy of European Law (ERA) offers training in ...
  - ✓ **Programme 2020**  
The Academy of European Law (ERA) offers training in ...
  - ✓ **Contact**  
The Academy of European Law (ERA) offers training in ...
  - ✓ **ERA – Europäische ...**  
Die Europäische Rechtsakademie (ERA) bietet Weiterbildung im ...
  - ✓ **Data Protection**  
Data Protection and the Law Enforcement Directive. Correct ...
  - ✓ **System message**  
The Academy of European Law (ERA) offers training in ...
- ✓ <https://www.linkedin.com/company/era-int> - **ERA-INT | LinkedIn**  
ERA-INT | 6 followers on LinkedIn. Engineering Resources and Assets | Engineers, Consultants and Contractors.



## Social Media

(Patricia will focus on this later)

## Platform or publisher?

## Print media

Provider of paper:

No liability for content

Publisher:

- Curated content
- Commission writer/artist



## Social Media

### Maintain:

- They are like the paper manufacturer
- Users provide the content independently

BUT

- They 'moderate' content (human & algorithmic systems)
- Encourage content
- Use algorithms to generate 'likes'
- Generate income from the content (and usage)



[https://www.ted.com/talks/james\\_matthews\\_how\\_the\\_like\\_button\\_is\\_shaping\\_your\\_opinions](https://www.ted.com/talks/james_matthews_how_the_like_button_is_shaping_your_opinions)



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3f66kBwfMto>



[info\(at\)inzeit\(dot\)eu](mailto:info@inzeit.eu)

## References & Further Reading

## CARRIER GRADE NAT

Europol (2017) Are you sharing the same IP address as a criminal? Law enforcement call for the end of Carrier Grade NAT (CGN) to increase accountability online

<https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/are-you-sharing-same-ip-address-criminal-law-enforcement-call-for-end-of-carrier-grade-nat-cgn-to-increase-accountability-online>

## PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR REQUESTING E-EVIDENCE ACROSS BORDERS

<https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/en/publications/practical-guide/practical-guide.html>

## SHODAN Videos

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## INTERNET OF THINGS

### ALEXA

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## BROWSER FINGERPRINTING

clickclickclick.click

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webkay.robinlinus.com

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[https://www.ted.com/talks/james\\_matthews\\_how\\_the\\_like\\_button\\_is\\_shaping\\_your\\_opinions](https://www.ted.com/talks/james_matthews_how_the_like_button_is_shaping_your_opinions)

## DEEPPAKES

Zuckerberg DeepFake

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3f66kBwfMto>



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Co-funded by the Justice  
Programme of the European Union 2014-2020

ERA Prague 2021

# OPEN SOURCE TOOLS, COMPUTER FORENSICS IN THE “CLOUD”

1



## Petar Majić

- FPZ - mag. ing. traff.
- Digital Forensics Consultant in INsig2 Ltd.



**INSIG2**

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## About INsig2

- 📍 Established in 2004, HQ in Zagreb
- 📍 2018 INsig2 business expansion in Indonesia
- 📍 50+ highly educated employees
- 📍 Educational & Training centre



### Education & Training Centre in Zagreb, Croatia


- Accommodates up to 15 people per classroom
- Equipment, forensic tools & materials provided



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## INsig2

- 📍 Three business units
- 📍 „One-stop-shop” in the field of Digital Forensics



4

# INsig2 Trainings

Intensive training schedule has been in place since late 2011 and since then INsig2 has successfully completed over 500 trainings at 5 continents and trained over 3000 law enforcement professionals



5

# Clients



Ministry of Interior Macedonia, Montenegro, Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Serbia, Slovenia



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## Partners

AccessData

SUMURI  
Forensics Simplified

TEEL technologies  
Canada

AMPED  
SOFTWARE

Belkasoft  
FORENSICS MADE EASIER

TEEL technologies  
Europe

paraben  
corporation

Digital  
Intelligence

IACIS  
The International Association of  
Computer Investigative Specialists

BlackBag  
TECHNOLOGIES

mh  
SERVICE GmbH

OXYGEN  
FORENSICS  
Helping good people to make this world safer

Guidance  
SOFTWARE

nunix

TABLEAU

MSAB

Cellebrite

MAGNET  
FORENSICS

ELCOMSOFT  
PROACTIVE SOFTWARE

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## Encryption

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## What is Encryption?

- 🔒 A security method used to protect data
- 🔒 Encryption: coding text
- 🔒 Decryption: decoding text



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## Why Do We Use Encryption?

- 🔒 To secure important information e.g. :
  - Credit card information
  - Network traffic
  - Data in general
  - Etc.
- 🔒 Prevents information from getting stolen or read
- 🔒 Without encryption, there is no reliable security



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## Types of encrypted evidence

- 🔒 Stored Passwords - Browsers and Password Managers
- 🔒 Files, Documents - Office, PDF, Archives, Mobile Backups
- 🔒 Full Disk Encryption - FileVault2, BitLocker, TrueCrypt...



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## Terminology

Plaintext

Original message

Algorithm

- Method how to change plaintext

Key

- Piece of information (a parameter) that determines the functional output of a cryptographic algorithm or cipher

Cipher Text


- Scrambled message

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## How does it work?

- Encryption allows the sender to transform data from **plain text** into **ciphertext** by using a **key**



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## Two sides to encryption

### The bad

- Data is inaccessible to law enforcement
- Criminal usage
- Hard to recover if keys are lost or unobtainable
- Everything is becoming more and more encrypted
- Ransomware

### The good

- Makes our data secure
- Makes our connections secure
- Low chance of data theft
- Privacy and security aspects
- Data validation



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## Dealing with encryption

🔗 What can law enforcement do against encryption?

- Tools for detection
- Doing a RAM dump on a live system to get the key
- Live acquisition if file/drive is open/mounted before evidence seizure or pulling the plug
- Get information about the suspect and use it for dictionary attack against encrypted data
- Speak to vendor or system administrator



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## Reverse image search

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## Reverse image search

- ☞ Is a search engine technology based on **Content-based image retrieval** (CBIR), that takes an image file as input query and returns results related to the image
- ☞ In OSINT investigation, pictures and general media are extremely powerful!
- ☞ What can be found by using reverse image search?



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## Reverse image search

- ☞ Search by Image – browser extension
- ☞ Google Images – <https://www.google.com/imghp?hl=en>
- ☞ Yandex Images – <https://yandex.com/images/>
- ☞ Flickr Image Search – <https://www.flickr.com/search/>
- ☞ Shutterstock – <https://www.shutterstock.com/>
- ☞ Getty Images – <https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/>
- ☞ Tin Eye – <https://tineye.com/>



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# Reverse image practical




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
old + round + building

Sve Slike Karte Videozapisi Vijesti Više Alati

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## EXIF data

- ☞ **Exchangeable Image File (EXIF)** is a standard that specifies the format for storing interchange information of images that use JPEG compression by digital cameras, smartphones...
  
- ☞ EXIF stores information such as:
  - Shutter speed
  - Exposure
  - Compression
  - Metering system that was used
  - ISO number
  - Date and time when the image was taken
  - GPS information



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## Exercise (EXIF data analysis)

- ☞ Use Pic2map website to find information:
  - 20210805\_143559.jpg



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## Pic2map results

Random Location
Upload Photos

**Camera:** Samsung SM-G985F

**Date:** Thu 5th of August 2021

**Address:** Campanile of the Cathedral of the Holy Virgin Mary's Ass...

**City:** Rab

**Country:** Croatia

**Location:** 44° 45' 16.70" N, 14° 45' 40.70" E

[View More Info](#) [Delete Photo](#)

Leaflet | Geocoding: © OpenStreetMap | Map Tiles © Here Maps

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## Pic2map results

CAMERA INFORMATION		
Brand:	Samsung	
Model:	SM-G985F	
Lens Info:	Unknown	
Shutter:	1/1488 (0.0007 seconds)	
F Number:	f/2	
ISO Speed:	ISO 25	
Flash:	Not Used	
Focal Length:	5.9 mm	
Color Space:	RGB	

FILE INFORMATION		
File Name:	20210805_143559.jpg	
Image Size:	9248 x 6936 pixels	
Resolution:	64.1 megapixels	
Unique ID:	R64LLMF05VM	
MIME Type:	image/jpeg	
Dots/Inch:	72 DPI	

DATE & TIME		
Date:	2021-08-05	
Time:	14:36:00 (GMT +02:00)	
Time Zone:	Europe / Ljubljana	

GPS INFORMATION		
Latitude:	44.754640	
Longitude:	14.761304	
Lat Ref:	North	
Long Ref:	East	
Coordinates:	44° 45' 16.70" N , 14° 45' 40.70" E	
Altitude:	0m. (Above Sea Level)	
Direction Ref:		
Direction:		
Pointing:		

LOCATION INFORMATION		
City:	Rab	
State:	Rab	
Country:	Croatia	

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# Jimpl.com

Aperture	2.0	FNumber	2.0	ImageHeight	6936
ApertureValue	2.0	FOV	67.4 deg	ImageSize	9248x6936
BitPerSample	8	FileAccessDate	2021-09-28 15:48:24 +0300	ImageUniqueID	R64LLMF05VM
BitStream	25.28	FileModeChangeDate	2021-09-28 15:48:24 +0300	ImageWidth	9248
CircularConfusion	0.007 mm	FileModifyDate	2021-09-28 15:48:24 +0300	LightValue	14.5
ColorComponents	3	FilePermissions	prw-----	MIMEType	image/jpeg
ColorSpace	sRGB	FileSize	0 bytes	Make	samsung
Compression	JPEG (old-style)	FileType	JPEG	MaxApertureValue	2.0
CreateDate	2021-08-05 14:36:00 +0300	FileTypeExtension	jpg	Megapixels	64.1
DateTimeOriginal	2021-08-05 14:36:00 +0300	Flash	No Flash	MeteringMode	Center-weighted average
DigitalZoomRatio	1	FocalLength	5.9 mm	Model	SM-G985F
EncodingProcess	Baseline DCT, Huffman coding	FocalLength35mmFormat	5.9 mm (35 mm equivalent: 27.0 mm)	ModifyDate	2021-08-05 14:36:00 +0300
ExifByteOrder	Little-endian (Intel, II)	FocalLengthIn35mmFormat	27 mm	OffsetTime	+02:00
ExifImageHeight	6936	GPSTimeStamp	44 deg 45' 16.70" N	OffsetTimeOriginal	+02:00
ExifImageWidth	9248	GPSLatitudeRef	North	Orientation	Horizontal (normal)
ExifVersion	0220	GPSLongitude	14 deg 45' 40.70" E	ResolutionUnit	Inches
ExposureCompensation	0	GPSLongitudeRef	East	ScaleFactor35mm	4.6
ExposureMode	Auto	GPSTimeStamp	44 deg 45' 16.70" N, 14 deg 45' 40.70" E	SceneCaptureType	Standard
ExposureProgram	Program AE	HyperfocalDistance	2.65 m	ShutterSpeed	1/1488
ExposureTime	1/1488	ISO	25	ShutterSpeedValue	1

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## Is it possible to see offline website?



**INNOVATION**

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## How to review a webpage or site that is offline



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## Offline website?

- 🔗 There are cases when you can't access the website
  
- 🔗 There can be several reasons:
  - Your IP
  - Organization restriction
  - Location
  - Site is offline



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## How to check if the site is up?

By using several free tools we can check if the site is online or offline

### Tools

- <https://www.isitdownrightnow.com>
- <https://www.websiteplanet.com/webtools/down-or-not/>
- <https://www.host-tracker.com>
- <https://www.site24x7.com/check-website-availability.html>



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## isitdownrightnow



### Is It Down Right Now ?

"Is It Down Right Now" monitors the status of your favorite web sites and checks whether they are down or not. Check a website status easily by using the below test tool. Just enter the url and a fresh site status test will be performed on the domain name in real time using our online website checker tool. For detailed information, check response time graph and user comments.

Enter a domain below to check whether it is down or not...



**Bbc.co.uk Server Status Check**

Website Name: BBC UK

URL Checked: www.bbc.co.uk

Response Time: 225.18 ms

Last Down: More than a week ago

**UP** Bbc.co.uk is UP and reachable by us.  
Please check and report on local outages below ...

[View Comments \(311\)](#) [Report an Issue](#)



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# Wayback Machine

- ☞ We can use Wayback Machine to see website snapshots from the past
- ☞ Wayback Machine is a digital archive of the World Wide Web
- ☞ Over 500 000 000 000 pages in archive
- ☞ Wayback Machine alternatives: **archive.today**, **Perma.cc**, **Pagefreezer...**



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INTERNET ARCHIVE Explore more than 591 billion web pages saved over time

[DONATE](#) **WaybackMachine**  Results: 50 100 500

[Calendar](#) · [Collections](#) · [Changes](#) · [Summary](#) · [Site Map](#)

Saved 134,120 times between December 2, 1998 and July 28, 2021.

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

JAN FEB MAR APR  
MAY JUN JUL AUG  
SEP OCT NOV DEC

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## Other useful tools

- OutWit Hub
- OSIRT
- Lumen
- Spiderfoot
- Hunchly
- FOCA

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## Physical and logical acquisition of data



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## Data acquisition

- 🔗 **Retrieving evidence data from various types of media**
- 🔗 **Acquisition tools**
  - software (forensic imaging programs)
  - hardware (write blockers, forensic duplicators, other forensic devices)
- 🔗 **Validation is necessary**
- 🔗 **Destination media**



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## Data acquisition

### Acquisition software

- EnCase, X-Ways, FTK Imager, Linux forensic distribution
- Pre - and post-acquisition hash → Verifying evidence integrity
- Generating forensic copies and image files

### Mounting images

- Images can be mounted as physical devices and assigned a drive number in Device Manager
- Running a live operating system off a forensic image



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## Sterile media

- As we know, even after deleting files there is leftover data
- If destination disks for forensic backups contain leftover data from earlier, it could be mistaken for evidence
  - Sterile media
- Sterile media has every byte overwritten with a known or random hex value
- Forensically sterile media → Every byte has the value of **0x00**
- Sterilization = wiping



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## Physical image

### Physical image:

- Will capture all ones and zeroes on a drive
- It will create an identical copy of the source drive
- Contains free space of the drive
- Allocated + unallocated space is imaged
- **Captures deleted files and fragments of a drive** (even if it was recently formatted)
- Takes a long time
- 1TB of source drive requires the same or more free space on the destination drive



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
## Logical image

### Logical image:

- Will capture all active data (the same as using File Explorer)
- Captures only allocated space on the disk
- Does not capture deleted files or free space
- If imaging a 1TB drive that only has 30GB of active data/files, the destination drive will only need 30GB
- Images can be created very fast




42



**Cloud providers and replicated data on websites and social media**



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**Cloud forensics**



*Cloud forensics is the application of digital forensic science in cloud environment*



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## Cloud forensics

- ☞ Identification of potential evidence
  - Storage networking and virtualization makes mapping storage devices complex
- ☞ Acquisition
  - Not possible to access physical incident scene
  - Not physical but logical items
- ☞ Not auditable
  - Investigations on dynamic systems that can't be frozen
  - Documentation and expertise
- ☞ Virtualization layer might add time drift



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## Inaccessibility of data in the Cloud

- ☞ Evidence can be spread all over the world
- ☞ Decentralized logs
- ☞ Virtual instances may migrate transparently between physical instances with little recordkeeping
- ☞ Problems:
  - **ACQUISITION**: Gathering data
  - **AUTHENTICATION**: User's data kept together with other user's data on same storage system, hard to separate



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## Large amount of Cloud data

- ☞ Storage space
- ☞ Acquisition and processing time increased
- ☞ Lot of information to analyse
  
- ☞ VM instance size increases with amount of data in VM
  - To get data, VM instance image needs to be downloaded



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## Why is evidence from social networks hard to collect?

- ☞ Multimedia
  - Can contain images, videos, text, comments, likes, location coordinates...
- ☞ Infinite scrolling
  - Can scroll infinitely
- ☞ Deeplinked content
  - 30% of social media messages contain links
- ☞ Link shorteners
  - Short links (bit.ly) can change over time or expire
  - Can lead to bad places



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## Why is evidence from social networks hard to collect?

- 🔗 Information credibility
  - Can be manipulated
  - Expert can get information but he can't be sure if the information is true
  - Possible to obtain information directly from social network
- 🔗 Information sensitivity
  - Can be deleted at any time by user
- 🔗 Information copying
  - Can be easily copied to storage device or saved as screenshot

## Chain of custody

- 🔗 One of the most vital issues in traditional digital forensic investigation
- 🔗 Clearly describes how the evidence was:
  - Collected
  - Analysed
  - Preserved
- 🔗 It starts with gaining physical control over evidence – in Cloud forensics, this step is not possible
- 🔗 Dependence on CSP to acquire evidence raises suspicions to whole investigation process

## Presentation in the court

- 🔗 Final step of digital investigation
- 🔗 Proving evidence from a complex structure of cloud computing – NOT EASY!
- 🔗 Court members possibly have basic knowledge of personal computers



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## Cloud forensics challenges

- 🔗 Jurisdiction
- 🔗 Lack of international collaboration
- 🔗 Investigating external chain of dependencies of the cloud provider
- 🔗 Lack of law/regulations
- 🔗 Decreased access and control over forensic data

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**Thank you!**



[petar.majic@insig2.com](mailto:petar.majic@insig2.com)





# Finding the needle somewhere in the internet

Dennis Pielken



Co-funded by the Justice Programme of the European Union 2014-2020

1

## Who am I?



RR, Dipl.-Ing.  
Dennis Pielken

- Lecturer for Cybercrime & Digital Investigations, Rhineland-Palatinate Police University
- Expert witness for digital forensics
- Working in digital forensics and digital investigations for the last 13 years

2

# Definition OSINT

## What is Open Source Intelligence?

„**Targeted** information gathering from publically available sources for **reliable** information to answer an **initial question** and preserve this information for future research.“

OSINT = **O**pen **S**ource **I**ntelligence

Finding the needle somewhere in the internet

3

3

# Example #1

**Known facts:** An unknown TOR-User provides a platform in the darkweb to share and distribute child pornography.

This TOR-User has a unique username.

Based on English terms used by this user, his country of origin can be guessed.

He also mentions in "public" chats that he is a passionate mountain bike cyclist.

Almost the same pseudonym was used in a mountain bike community, where this user published his tracks.

User was identified based on this information using traditional Police investigation techniques.

Finding the needle somewhere in the internet

4

4

# What is Silkroad?

**Silk Road**  
anonymous market

messages 1 | orders 0 | account \$0.00

Search [Go]

Shop by Category

- Drugs 2,995
  - Cannabis 341
  - Dissociatives 65
  - Ecstasy 209
  - Opioids 166
  - Other 144
  - Precursors 12
  - Prescription 526
  - Psychedelics 427
  - Stimulants 273
- Apparel 114
- Art 7
- Books 743
- Collectibles 12
- Computer equipment 19
- Custom Orders 26
- Digital goods 310
- Drug paraphernalia 69
- Electronics 20
- Erotica 319
- Fireworks 2
- Food 3
- Forgeries 58
- Hardware 2
- Home & Garden 7
- Jewelry 48
- Lab Supplies 5
- Lotteries & games 29
- Medical 5

Product listings include:

- 5x - 10mg Deseridine (Pure Dextroamphetamine) \$4.94
- 2 x 0.25 mg Xanax (Alprazolam) \$1.50
- Melania chairs hand rubbed Indian hash 100g \$75.83
- 1 Gram OO HUSH OIL 61% THC 90% TOTAL \$4.13
- 14 grams (1/2 ounce) of HMDL JWH-122 \$2.63
- 3.5g Crystal Meth Ice shards 20 x 25mg Chalks \$2.57
- 10g Polycyber-Cubensis-Chocolata III \$18.15
- 100x Orange Star Very high MDMA content 100mg
- 100x 200mg White XTC 'Speakers'
- 3g Methylene Crystals -850- Lab Grade
- 15mg Adderal Extended Release (1 Capsule)


Finding the needle somewhere in the internet

5

5

# Example #2 Silkroad

Shortly after Silkroad went live:



Finding the needle somewhere in the internet

6

6

## Example #2 Silkroad – cont.

- few hours later
- A user **Ross Ulbricht** asks for help regarding a programming problem
  - The user name is changed from Ross Ulbricht to frosty and the Email address is changed to **frosty@forsty.com**
  - The email address *frosty@forsty.com* was also used on Silkroad by its administrator

Finding the needle somewhere in the internet

7

7

## OSINT: The challenges

- Managing the **information tsunami**
- How can we determine that information is **reliable**?
- How do we **preserve** this information / evidence?

Finding the needle somewhere in the internet

8

8

## Different identifier, different question

E-Mail-  
Adresse

Phone  
number

Pseudo-  
nym

Name

What main / initial question needs to be answered in respect to the identifier?

- E-Mail-Adresse: Where has this email address been used on other platforms?
- Phone number: Is this phone number still active?

Standard search engines are not always the best starting point.

Finding the needle somewhere in the internet

9

9

## Identifier: Name

### Question

- What kind of information are available about this person`

### Starting Points

- People search engines, such as [www.yasni.de](http://www.yasni.de), [www.spokeo.com](http://www.spokeo.com), [www.pipl.com](http://www.pipl.com) or [www.northdata.de](http://www.northdata.de)

Finding the needle somewhere in the internet

10

10

## Identifier: E-Mail-Adresse

### Question

- Where has this email address been used to register an account?

### Start points

- Data leakage sites:
  - <http://haveibeenpwned.com>
  - <https://ghostproject.fr/>
  - <https://dehashed.com>
- Use a standard search engine, eg. google

11

## Have I been pwned?

The website [www.haveibeenpwned.com](http://www.haveibeenpwned.com) allows Internet users to check whether their personal data has been compromised by data breaches.

**Search based on an email address to check, if this address is included in a data breach.**

';--have i been pwned?  
Check if you have an account that has been compromised in a data breach

email address pwned?

12

# Identifier: Pseudonym

## Question

- Is this username/pseudonym being used on other side

## Search engines

- Using one website to check, if this username exist on other sites:
  - <https://namechk.com/>
  - <https://namecheckup.com/>
  - <https://knowem.com/>
  - <https://usersearch.org/>
  - <https://archive.org/details/@NAMEDESUSERS>
- Search in social networks
  - (<https://www.social-searcher.com/>)

Finding the needle somewhere in the internet

13

13

# The challenge – what is reliable information

not unique  
pseudonyms or  
names

fake profiles for  
hiding

misinformation

„Didn't find  
anything“  
means doesn't  
exit?

Finding the needle somewhere in the internet

14

14

# social media as a data source



What is facebook?

Users to connect with friends and family by sharing status updates, personal photos and other items of interest.



What is instagram?

photo and video sharing social networking service



What is twitter?

Microblogging (posts limited to 280 characters) and social networking service on which users post and interact with messages known as "tweets"

Finding the needle somewhere in the internet

15

15

# Live Demonstration



Finding the needle somewhere in the internet

16

16

Questions?

Finding the needle somewhere in the internet 17

17





Co-funded by the Justice Programme of the European Union 2014-2020



University of Antwerp  
Faculty of Law

# Websites and social media

the legal challenges of dealing with electronic evidence  
in criminal proceedings

Prof. dr. Joachim Meese  
associate professor  
attorney

1


## most common types of e-evidence

- **basic subscriber information**
  - e.g. name, e-mail, phone number, ...
- **traffic data**
  - e.g. connection logs, number of messages, ...
- **content data**
  - e.g. photos, content of messages or e-mails, files, ...

2

## most common types of e-evidence


- most often needed type of e-evidence from foreign authorities or online service providers in 2019:



3

## most common types of e-evidence

- three most contacted online service providers in 2019:



4

## characteristics of e-evidence

- **volatile, can easily and quickly be deleted**
- **cross-border**
  - according the Commission 85% of criminal investigations require electronic evidence
  - approx. 2/3 of electronic evidence is located in another State (both within and outside the EU)
- **necessity for quick intervention**
- **hard to locate and access evidence**
  - e.g. in cases where the origin of cyber attacks or location of e-evidence is not (yet) known
  - data redundancy

## dealing with e-evidence

- **cloud-stored data: what about jurisdiction?**
  - possible theories:
    - criminal event theory (territorial)
    - criminal instrument theory (territorial)
    - direct consequence theory (extra-territorial)
    - nationality principle theory (extra-territorial)

## dealing with e-evidence

### ▪ key aspects:

- ensuring authenticity of digital data
- chain of custody
  - proper and detailed documentation of access to data, its storage, copying and analysis (without changing the data)
  - analysis and further work with digital data is only done with a copy, not the original set of data
  - proper documentation of the police staff that is involved and the IT forensic software that is being used
- see ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence

[https://www.digital-detective.net/digital-forensics-documents/ACPO\\_Good\\_Practice\\_Guide\\_for\\_Digital\\_Evidence\\_v5.pdf](https://www.digital-detective.net/digital-forensics-documents/ACPO_Good_Practice_Guide_for_Digital_Evidence_v5.pdf)

7

## dealing with e-evidence


### ▪ common procedures for recognising & handling e-evidence

- in most European member States: no specific regulations
  - e.g. Belgium
- therefore:
  - general principles of dealing with analogue evidence also apply to digital/electronic evidence
  - (soft) regulations within different authorities (e.g. police, federal authorities like the Belgian FCCU)
  - best practices and efforts to certificate certain IT forensic software
  - legislation on the international/European level

8

## cross-border access to evidence

### possible scenarios:




9

## cross-border access to evidence

### possible scenarios:

- ✓ within EU: EIOD
- ✓ outside EU: international agreements
  - Budapest Convention on cybercrime
  - bilateral agreements concluded by
    - the EU (e.g. the agreement with the US of 23 October 2009)
    - the member States (most frequently with the US, Canada or Australia)




10

## cross-border access to evidence

### possible scenarios:

number of requests per year on e-evidence:

- ✓ between EU member States: 13.000
- ✓ EU MS to US: 1.300




11

## cross-border access to evidence

### possible scenarios:

- ✓ MLA challenges
  - hard to get a timely response to a request
  - too much formalities
  - too complicated and technical to use




12

## cross-border access to evidence

### possible scenarios:

- ✓ EIOD challenges
  - Ireland, Denmark and UK are not bound
  - too slow for e-evidence
  - too formalistic for e-evidence
  - not adapted to complex e-evidence situations
  - high cost and capacity requirements
  - legal impediments




13

## cross-border access to evidence

### possible scenarios:

- ✓ non-content data
  - service providers established in the US and, to a more limited extent, in Ireland, which reply directly to requests from EU member States law enforcement authorities on a voluntary basis
- ✓ WHOIS data
  - service providers make data directly available to authorities through a centralised search system which does not rely on individually reviewed requests



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## cross-border access to evidence

### possible scenarios:


numbers:



→ in 2018, 3 member States account for > 75% of all requests from the entire EU

- Germany: 35.271
- UK: 28.598
- France: 27.268

→ Google & Facebook: 70% of total requests




15

## cross-border access to evidence

### possible scenarios:

#### ✓ challenges

- can be unreliable
- can take too long
- only possible with a limited number of service providers
- providers all apply different policies
- not transparent
- lacks accountability in case of non-compliance
  - see, however the Belgian case of YAHOO! (Cass. 1 December 2015, P.13.2082.N)




16

## cross-border access to evidence

### possible scenarios:

- ✓ extended search (following seizure of a device)
- ✓ remote search (following lawful acquisition of login information)
- possible under national law of at least 20 member States
- this tool becomes more relevant
  - data are regularly stored on servers in a different location
  - in case of loss of knowledge of location of data (e.g. Darknet)




17

## cross-border access to evidence

### possible scenarios:

- ✓ challenges
  - different approaches by member States to direct access & to data storage location
  - risk of losing data
    - ✓ data can easily and swiftly be deleted from another device
    - ✓ data can be lost when gathering and moving it



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## cross-border access to evidence: what about EPO?

### ▪ EPO (not into force yet)

- what: legal framework laying down the rules under which an authority of a Member State may order a service provider offering services in the Union, to produce or preserve electronic evidence, regardless of the location of data
  - EPdO: European Production Order (<-> EPOC)
  - EPsO: European Preservation Order (<-> EPOC-PR)
- title: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters
- background: driven by the fight against terrorism
  - establishing security is one of top policy priorities of the EU
  - an instrument for transnational access to e-evidence in the EU is a pressing issue

## cross-border access to evidence: MLA, EIOD or EPO?

### ▪ EPO

- texts & sources
  - original Commission proposal (17 April 2018)
    - [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs\\_autres\\_institutions/commission\\_europeenne/com/2018/0225/COM\\_COM\(2018\)0225\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2018/0225/COM_COM(2018)0225_EN.pdf)
  - the Council's general approach (11 Juni 2019)
    - <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10206-2019-INIT/en/pdf>
  - Report Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (11 December 2020)
    - [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2020-0256\\_EN.html](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2020-0256_EN.html)
  - Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council (20 July 2021)
    - <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11007-2021-INIT/en/pdf>
    - launch of EU-US negotiations to facilitate access to electronic evidence: 19 July 2021
  - Draft regulation: certain issues (26 August 2021)
    - <https://db.eurocrim.org/db/en/doc/3646.pdf>

## cross-border access to evidence: MLA, EIOD or EPO?

### ▪ EPO

#### ▪ texts & sources

- State of play and possible ways forward (16 September 2021)
  - <https://www.statewatch.org/media/2739/eu-council-e-evidence-regulation-state-of-play-11681-21.pdf>
- also important: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings
  - <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/HIS/?uri=COM:2018:226:FIN>
  - general approach: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7348-2019-INIT/EN/pdf>

## Comparative scheme: key characteristics

### MLA

- traditional instrument of international cooperation
- all kinds of investigative measures
- important in the relationship with third States, mainly with the USA
- complex, lots of formalities, takes time

### EIOD

- all kinds of investigative measures (except in the framework of JIT)
- inspired by mutual recognition
- execution by domestic authorities or by third parties
- in theory within 120 days
- Directive

### EPO

- only for electronic information
- restricted to criminal proceedings
- directly addressed to service provider and to executing authority
- some orders can be issued for all criminal offences and for most types of data stored
- location of data is not relevant
- a new type of cooperation instrument based on advanced form of mutual trust
- (extraordinary?) simplification of procedure
- Regulation (no transposition!)

# Thank you!

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 [www.linkedin.com/in/joachimmeese/](https://www.linkedin.com/in/joachimmeese/)

 @JoachimMeese

## Social media and electronic evidence

How social media networks yield digital evidence of the planning and commission of crimes, and assisted in cyber investigations resulting in the creation of solid cases against the defendants , or their acquittals




Co-funded by the Justice  
Programme of the European Union 2014-2020

Prague 18-19 October 2021

Patricia Ayodeji  
Lawyer, England, Wales & Spain  
[payodeji@icab.cat](mailto:payodeji@icab.cat)  
[www.e-pdp.eu](http://www.e-pdp.eu)



1



### How?

Gathering valuable evidence: profiles, lists of friends, group memberships, events attended, timeline/wall/feeds posts, tweets, re-tweeting photos, videos, likes, login times etc.etc.

## Organisations involved in the investigations

Central Intelligence Service against Terrorism & Organized  
Crime (TEPOL) Judgement No. 1

Central Section of Information Technology Crimes (SCDTI)  
Case No. 4



2

## Spain – Different types of police forces

### Civil Guard (Guardia Civil)

Military rank. Judicial unit. Cybercrime.

Counterterrorism ++



### National Police (Policia nacional)

Civil rank. Judicial unit. Violent crime. Border control. Terrorism ++

### Local or Municipal Police (Guardia Urbana in Catalonia)

Mostly Local Authority enforcement matters. Serious matters are handed over to either the Civil Guard or National Police

### Autonomous police (Mozos de Escuadra, in Catalonia).

Demonstrations etc.

3

## Civil Guard

**GDT** Grupo de Delitos Telemáticos  
Unidad Central Operativa

GOBIERNO DE ESPAÑA  
MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR  
GUARDIA CIVIL

Inicio  
La unidad  
Consejos de seguridad  
Enlaces de seguridad  
Preguntas más frecuentes  
Denunciar el delito  
Quiero denunciar  
Quiero informar  
Colaborar con el GDT  
Recursos  
Multimedia  
Libro X1Red+Segura

TELEFONIA  
ALERTAS  
COMUNICACION  
RELACIONES  
SERVICIOS  
LOCALIZACION

**GDT**  
Grupo Delitos Telemáticos  
UNIDAD CENTRAL OPERATIVA

GUARDIA CIVIL  
MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR

Ayúdanos a perseguir los delitos en la red.

<https://www.gdt.guardiacivil.es/webgdt/multimedia.php> DENUNCIAR EL DELITO

4



**Civil Guard**  
[www.gdt.guardacivil.es](http://www.gdt.guardacivil.es)

### TELEMATIC CRIMES GROUP (GDT)

The most specialized unit dealing with complex investigations.  
 Chase the crimes of glorifying terrorism in social networks  
 National. Teams in each of the Spanish provinces.

Interpol  
 G-8 for cybercrime  
 Europol

Other investigations dealt with by the Technological  
 Investigation Teams (EDITEs)

5

### Resources of e-Evidence



**Social Media** a form of e-communication : websites and apps enabling users to share content or participate in social networking

**Digital Evidence** any probative info. stored or transmitted in digital form over the internet or computer networks.

6




Lists of friends, events, groups, likes, tweets, retweets....Do they matter?

7



**Spanish Courts**

8



9

**Spanish Court  
decisions  
Criminal Code**

The graphic consists of a black silhouette of a scale of justice with a Spanish flag at its base. To the right, the text 'Spanish Court decisions Criminal Code' is written in red. Below the text is a black smartphone icon with a white speech bubble on its screen.

10



**Growing number of convictions including custodial sentences.**

**Catch all labels?**

**Disproportionate restrictions to the right to freedom of expression?**

11



**Judgment No. 1 June 2018 – Provincial Audience (Audiencia Nacional) Madrid**  
**Case No. 18/2018**  
**Crime: Glorification of Terrorism**  
**Central Intelligence Service against Terrorism & Organized Crime (TEPOL)**  
**Citizen Reports before Civil Guard:** Initially no privacy settings preventing access to profile.

**Internet history.** Constant accessing & viewing ,saving of terrorist material & subsequent publication in his social media profiles. High level of Internet usage.

**Facebook** profile logo associated with Al -Qaeda

**Twitter** associated with his mobile number. Al-Qaeda flag.  
**Whatsapp** with terrorist images .

Previous conviction for murder related to terrorist groups.

12



**Continued: Judgment No. 1 June 2018 – Provincial Audience (Audiencia Nacional) Madrid  
Case No. 18/2018**

Vast volumes of digital evidence generated by mobile and computer

Purchase of **internet cards** to evade detection & browse anonymously

**Internet savvy . Anonymizing Proxy Server** to make IP anonymous & appear as if in different country to which he was really accessing.

**Tox network** for enabling anonymous communication

**Whatsapp, App Imo** – to exchange encrypted messages

**Twitter** – changed from public tweets to protected tweets using tools used by some marketing professionals and experts

Search warrant -House - Pendrive 158,710 terrorist group files. Hard drive: docs to make explosives. Bit2bit copy. **Convicted. 4 years .**

13

**“Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned”**

William Congreve (English playwright & Poet)



14

**Judgment No. 2 June 2018 – Provincial Audience  
(Audiencia Provincial) Valladolid  
Case No.00184/2018**



**Crime: Harassment**

Legality & procedural concerns of admissibility

**Facebook:** Threatening messages to ex  
Court order- Facebook Ireland Ltd.- IP address, time line etc. Preservation of digital evidence-copy made of profile to avoid loss or destruction. Instructions not to notify profile user  
Vodafone Spain – name & address of the owner of IP address. – dates & times.

Appeal against conviction - Account & User ID , Reasonable expectation of privacy violated  
Authenticity of the info; prove accused was the author -  
IP not secure & could be intercepted by third parties,  
Wi-Fi.

**Guilty 2 month fine of 8€ a day**

15

**Judgement No. 3  
Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) Sala  
Segunda, de lo Penal, Judgement 72/2018  
9 Feb. 2018, Rec. 583/2017**



**Miguel – 2 tweet accounts**

**Criminal code- glorification of terrorism and incitement  
to hatred  
(women & victims of domestic violence)**

**@ Email of Police Unit Social Media II: control,  
following and analysis of content published in social  
media- from various citizens complaining + 2 complaints  
in different police stations.**

**Dates & content. 1 account closed by Twitter  
Guilty**

16

**Case No. 4  
Supreme Court**




TRIBUNAL SUPREMO  
Causa especial 20907/2017

17

***Crime: Catalan Independence Referendum 1 October 2017 after 18 attempts to organize a Scottish-style referendum with successive Spanish Governments )ruled illegal by Spain's constitutional court – went ahead and followed by declaration of independence***



-  Analysis of forensic techniques for the acquisition of digital evidence
-  Acquisition, copy & analysis of computer equipment and networks
-  Copy & analysis of mass storage devices or mobiles
-  **Analysis of information from websites and social networks**
-  IP user data to identify and locate users and computer equipment

18

II.



- ❖ Whatsapp
- ❖ Twitter
- ❖ Auto destructive SMS
- ❖ Emails
- ❖ Cloning of webpages (140) created to promote referendum - name & address of the owner of IP address (mostly with servers in the US)

19

III.



**Law on the Referendum on Self-determination of Catalonia** : Law that governs the holding of the Referendum of **1-0**

**7 September 2017** –Law declared illegal & suspended by the Constitutional Court after a request from the Spanish government, who declared it a breach of the Spanish Constitution.

In early September High Court of Justice of Catalonia issued orders to the police to try to prevent it, including the detention of various persons responsible for its preparation.

20

**IV:**



**1 October 2017** referendum held (referendum of **1-0**)

**27 October 2017**- The ruling separatists in the Catalan parliament declared independence. Madrid imposed direct rule by invoking Article 155 of the constitution - a first for Spain.

From **12 February 2019**, trial in the Supreme Court in Madrid of the Catalan Independence leaders

21

**VI.**

### **How *not* to present digital evidence in Court....**



**Thursday 21<sup>st</sup> February 2019**

**Email** :to Jordi Sanchez (ANC - Catalan National Assembly ) 28/09/17 to block streets with cars

**State Prosecutor:** Received!

**Sanchez:** First time seeing it is in the court– no evidence that opened/read. Court order to read his emails but no expert called to prove opened/read by Sanchez. Sender of email not called as witness.

22



## VII.

Contradictory opinion of computer security experts: **Central Section of Information Technology Crimes** (Sección Central de Delitos en Tecnologías de la Información -SCDTI)

### Complaints of Investigators:

**Whatsapp** – not susceptible to live intervention. End-to-end encryption  
Methods and data extraction and decryption tools to recover essential data.

**Twitter** – **Who is behind various profiles** - personal data used to create, IP, ....

**Emails** – Intervened by Civil Guard - **no technical analysis as to when/if read by recipient.**

Auto destructive SMS

23



TRIBUNAL SUPREMO  
Causa especial 20907/2017

**4 month trial**  
**8 months later the Judgment for**  
**failed attempt to split from Spain**

493 pages

24



## 9 Catalan independence leaders prison sentences between 9-13 years

**Oriol Junqueras:** Former VP of Catalonia & leader of Catalan Republican Party (ERC) **13 years**

**Jordi Sànchez:** **Activist** Ex-President of the civil association ANC **9 years**

**Jordi Cuixart:** **Activist** President of civil association Òmnium Cultural **9 years**

**Raül Romeva:** Former Catalan Minister of Foreign Affairs **12 years**

**Jordi Turull:** Former Catalan Minister of State **12 years**

**Josep Rull:** Former Territorial Minister **10 years**

**Joaquim Forn:** Former Catalan Interior Minister **10 years**

**Dolors Bassa:** Ex social welfare Minister **12 years**

**Carme Forcadell:** Ex-speaker of the Catalan Parliament **11.5 years**

Former Head of Catalan Regional Government **Carles Puigdemont** fled Spain in the wake of the unilateral declaration of independence. Has been living in Belgium ever since.

**22 June 2021 Spain pardons the leaders**

**23 Sept. 2021 Puigdemont arrested in Italy**

25

### Judgement No. 5

Provincial Audience (Audiencia Provincial) Madrid,  
Sección 17ª, Sentencia 132/2020 de 2 Mar. 2020, Rec.  
536/2019



**Islam. Public profile. Convicted 2.5 years. 540 friends sufficient**

26



**Judgement No.6**  
**Provincial Audience (Audiencia Provincial)**  
**Valencia, Section 2ª, Judgment 468/2020**  
**19 Nov. 2020, Rec. 44/2020**

## **Glorifying terrorism and incitement to hatred**

**No followers no consequences.**  
**No real or imminent danger**



27



28



64



**Juagement No. 7**  
**Supreme Court(Tribunal Supremo) Sala Segunda, de lo**  
**Penal, Sentencia 135/2020 de 7 May. 2020, Rec.**  
**3344/2018**

**Pablo Hasél**  
**1st Rapper imprisoned**  
**in Europe**

29



64



**Pablo Hasél**  
**Glorifying terrorism & libels and**  
**insults to the Crown and Police**

**64 tweets (2014-16) including**  
**references to banned guerilla groups,**  
**comparing a court to Nazis, calling**  
**former monarch Juan Carlos I a mafia**  
**boss.**

30



64



**Pablo Hasél**


**Glorifying terrorism & libels and  
insults to the Crown & Police**

Controversial lyrics in YouTube

Imprisoned from 15/02/2021

11/03/2021 Council of Europe Commissioner for  
Human Rights letter to Minister of Justice of  
Spain

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**Mobile evidence**  
**Judgement No. 8**

**Criminal Court (Juzgado Penal) number 25**  
**Barcelona, 6 October 2020**

**Tamara Carrasco**

**From glorification of terrorism to Public Disorder**

**Member of CUP (Pro- Independence protestors)**

**Group for the Defence of Catalan Referendum (GDRC) Before Referendum**

**Committees in Defence of the Catalan Referendum (CDR) After Referendum of 1/10/17**

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## Tamara Carrasco

**Crime: 25/02/18**

**Text & Audio message in Whatsapp in Group about Tsunami of Protests – road blocks on major highways and acts of sabotage (5) related to detention & imprisonment of Catalan Independence leaders and the detention of Former Head of Catalan Regional Government Puigdemont in Germany**

**All actions subsequently occurred.**

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## Tamara Carrasco

**+ was in various videos (25/11/2017) in Twitter as member of CDR**

**-identified by local police (Mozos) in motorway which had been blocked on the same day (27/03/2018)**

**Analysis of mobile and hardware – partially recuperated evidence. Possible deletion of Whatsapp. Timing of deletion coincided with timing of distribution of the audio message. Acquitted. Source of Whatsapp not investigated. Whatsapp did not incite public disorder. No proof of distribution beyond Whatsapp group. Talk of max. numbers in a group. **September 2021 appeal****

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## Whatsapp & sister-in-law

**Judgment No. 9  
Supreme Court  
Case No. 599/2021, 7th July, 2021**

**Crime: Harrassment. Otilia and her Sister-in-Law,  
Montserrat**

**Otilia 500 whatsapps, various SMS & stalking Montserrat**

**Convicted.1 year.**

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## Innovative tools for Digital Investigation

Blackbag Technologies

BlueBear

Magnet Forensics

Cellebrite

AccessData

Sumuri Forensics Simplified

Oxygen Forensics

MSAB

Lleida. Net

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# Thank you

**Images:**

The Noun Project,: Megan Chawn, Adrien Coquet, Monkik, Sebastian Wiercinski, Skip The Line Barcelona

<https://www.freepik.com/vectors/logo>">Logo vector created by myriammira - www.freepik.com</a>

[https://www.freepik.com/premium-photo/compliance-rule-law-regulation-graphic-interface-business-quality-policy\\_9003591.htm#query=law%20and%20technology&position=12](https://www.freepik.com/premium-photo/compliance-rule-law-regulation-graphic-interface-business-quality-policy_9003591.htm#query=law%20and%20technology&position=12)

<https://www.freepik.com/free-vector/protest-demonstration-people-isometric-icons->  
[Background photo created by rawpixel.com - www.freepik.com](https://www.freepik.com/photos/background)</a>  
[set\\_4270093.htm#page=1&query=activist%20icon&position=12](https://www.freepik.com/photos/background)

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Privacy & General Data Protection Regulation

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**PRIVACY AND INFORMATION SECURITY**      **LITIGATION**

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The Law Society of England and Wales      Solicitors Regulation Authority      Australian Embassy

British Chamber of Commerce in Spain      EMBASSY OF IRELAND Spain      CONSUL GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES BARCELONA · SPAIN

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# Too Hot to Handle?

## Electronic Evidence in Court




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1



# The Map



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2



## 3 Aspects to Evidence

Key to all evidence:

- Is it admissible?
- Is it reliable?
- Is it valuable?

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## Look and Feel of Electronic Evidence

- Not Tangible
- Not Visible
- Not Audible
- Volatile

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4



## Existence

- Only on a device or storage medium
- Only useful in combination with an app or other piece of software
- Subject to easy or default encryption
- Might be stored in the cloud
- Or otherwise on 3rd party device

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## Admissibility

- What did the police do to reach the evidence?
- What did they do to decrypt the evidence?
- Were these actions in accordance with the law, the ECHR
- Was he breach of privacy necessary?
- Was it appropriate in relation to the seriousness of the crime?

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## Examples

- Searching in a smartphone\*
- Extortion or illegal promises to obtain passwords
- Forced use of biometrics
- Running a Darkweb marketplace\*
- Cross border examinations\*

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## Reliability

- What did the police do to secure the evidence? Forensic Image? Hashvalue?
- What Forensic Tool was used?
- What steps have been taken?
- Has it all been documented?

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## Value

- Who was operating the device?
- Possession means control. Unallocated clusters? Temporary Internetfiles?
- Not found = not there?

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## Note/Question

- What to do with electronic evidence submitted by the defence?
- What to do with evidence you find yourself in open sources?

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## When in Court

Presentation:

- Witness or expert statements
- Police reports of expert reports
- Screenshots
- Sound recordings
- Printouts

There is no such thing as the original!

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## Translation

- Lawyers use words
- Data uses bits and bytes
- “Translation” by experts
- Experts in computer forensics may be employed by the police or by independent organisations (or be self-employed)

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## Independent Experts

Do not rely on police expertise only

- When the evidence is questioned by the defence (with reasonable arguments)
- In complex cases with many electronic aspects
- When electronic evidence is very important or decisive
- If you can rely on a budget.....

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## Conclusion/What to do?

1. Ask yourself: What was done to get this evidence?
2. Ask yourself: How was it secured, investigated and was that documented?
3. Questions unanswered or when in doubt: bring in the expert.
4. Never Stop Asking!

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## Internet and Social Networks

- Publicly known facts need no further evidence
- What could be found easily on the web could be such a fact
- Depending on the reliability of the internet source and what query was needed to find the information
- When in doubt, mention the source in court and have it recorded

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## Internet and Social Networks

- Police may surf Social Networks like any other person
- No further authorisation needed
- No objection to surfing under a fake name
- However:
  - When aspects of someone's private life are revealed or recorded a prosecutor's order is needed (or a court order)
  - Actively interfering in contacts or groups is also ruled by special legislation

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# Smartfones



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Gerechshof  
s-Hertogenbosch

17



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de Rechtspraak  
Gerechshof  
s-Hertogenbosch

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## Changing Legal Regime

**ECLI:NL:HR:2017:584**

**Before: If you seize an object, you may search it, including stored data**

**After: Rule stands, but not if your search means a serious breach of privacy, if that's the case you need a prosecutor's order  
If the search causes a very serious breach you need a court order.**

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## Alpha Bay



**THIS HIDDEN SITE HAS BEEN SEIZED**  
Since July 4, 2017

as a part of a law enforcement operation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration and European law enforcement agencies acting through Interpol

in accordance with the law of European Union member states and obtained pursuant to a forfeiture order by the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of California and the U.S. Department of Justice's Computer Crime & Intellectual Property Section

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## Alpha Bay

- Dark Web
- 1 of Big 3, 200.000 users 40.000 vendors
- Since 2014 at least \$ 1 billion traded
- Taken down July 4th 2017, why then?

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## Hansa Market



**THIS HIDDEN SITE HAS BEEN SEIZED**  
and controlled since June 20

by the Dutch National Police in cooperation with the Bundeskriminalpolizei, Lietuvos Policija, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Europol, under the authority of the Dutch National Prosecutor's Office and the Attorney General's office of the Federal State of Thuringia (Germany).

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## Hansa Market

- Investigation since 2016 FBI, DEA and NL
- 2 operators in Germany, servers in Germany, NL en Lithuania
- Taken over and operated under NL judicial authority on June 20th 2017
- After July 4th, visit boosted 1000 to 8000 daily
- 1000 transactions daily

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## Hansa Market

- Questions:
- Was the evidence legally obtained?
- Police facilitating illegal transactions?
- How was the evidence stored and processed?
- Cross border evidence?

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## The Court Decision

**ECLI:NL:RBROT:2019:5339**

38.709 pillen XTC, en/of  
 63.742 trips/hoeveelheden LSD, en/of  
 95.855,35 gram molly/MDMA, en/of  
 3.912 capsules MDMA, en/of  
 5.019,2 gram cocaine, en/of  
 129 gram meth/amfetamine,

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## The Court Decision 2

- There is a legal basis: Infiltration
- Thoroughly protocols
- Clear insight in operation
- No other effective means to put an end to this
- No provocation

Conclusion: prosecution may be received, evidence admissible

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## Ennetcom



Ennetcom  
encrypted  
BlackBerry®

CERTIFICATES  
X.509  
COMBINATION

ENCRYPTION  
AES 256  
ENCRYPTION

DIGITAL • KEY • MANAGEMENT  
PKI

www.ennetcom.com

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## Ennetcom

- Criminals used special Blackberries
- Only messaging through Ennetcom infrastructure
- PGP encryption, so very robust
- Encryption keys generated by endusers
- But in fact generated by the Ennetcom servers.

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Gerechthof  
Hertogenbosch

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## Ennetcom

- Servers found in Canada
- Keymanagementsystem found and copied
- Messages only 24 hs saved?
- But several millions of items available?
- 1 mln nicknames
- Lawyer claims impossible in a legal way

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## Ennetcom

- Police claim 500 users/nicknames identified, used in 25 investigations
- In October 2016 received, in November already first use.
- Between 13/10/2016 and 12/7/2017 1,6 mln messages downloaded in “Hansken”
- Filtered: less than 3 words, non-Dutch or English

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## Ennetcom

- Results searched with topics, typical words used in organised crime
- 5503 positive addresses and 4282 contacts
- Of which 500 identified

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## Ennetcom

- Questions:
- What steps are taken from seizure?
- Reliability of identification proces
- Exculpatory evidence disappeared?
- No context available, consequence?
- David Graus: “Naive and Unreliable method” Invalid verifiability.

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## Enchrochat, one step further

- Law enforcement agencies hacked the server of the service provider
- Handheld devices connected to the server and were infected
- Messages intercepted before encryption
- Decryption passwords intercepted

- Tremendous impact in terms of intelligence and investigations
- But what are the legal implications of:
  - No full disclosure of the operations
  - Cross border hacking
  - Goldmine for lawyers

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## ANoM

- FBI arrests a man who owns and exploits an encrypted network
- Suspect offers cooperation
- FBI sells encrypted handhelds through undercover agents and storefronts
- Subjects talk freely about drugs, guns and money

- Fruitful harvest of intelligence, money, quantities of drugs and arrests
- What to do with the evidence?

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 Thank you for your attention!

John van Krieken LLM MMO  
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+31648135890

Prague, October 18 & 19, 2021

  
de Rechtspraak  
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Co-funded by the Justice  
Programme of the European Union 2014-2020

# Handling Electronic Evidence in Courts

The importance of the chain of custody in handling evidence  
• Trial considerations: methods of presentation and admissibility tests

06/10/2021

Criminal justice across borders



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## CYBERCRIME AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE



Focus	2018	2019	2020	2018	2019	2020	2018	2019	2020	2018	2019	2020
Migrant smuggling	71	86	99	17	24	21	3	2	2	12	12	12
THB	150	183	163	43	54	56	0	4	2	56	61	48
Terrorism	84	95	69	20	24	12	0	0	0	12	8	7
Cybercrime	98	126	174	28	34	45	2	3	1	10	17	21
Corruption	78	76	93	19	14	8	0	0	0	6	5	5
Drug trafficking	450	463	562	78	80	87	0	2	4	42	51	50
Environmental crime	24	14	20	6	8	6	0	1	0	4	6	6
Money-laundering	436	531	595	94	138	101	6	6	7	49	72	64
Swindling and fraud	909	1112	1264	87	112	91	7	12	8	50	64	68
MOCG	273	312	380	26	20	19	1	2	1	15	17	13
PIF	56	140	128	9	15	20	1	2	2	8	11	10
Core international crimes	n/a	n/a	12	n/a	n/a	2	n/a	n/a	0	n/a	n/a	0

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

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## CYBERCRIME AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE



- ▶ Digital evidence will be needed in around 85% of criminal investigations
- ▶ In two-thirds of these investigations, it is necessary to obtain it from OSPs established in another jurisdiction – increasing numbers
- ▶ Not clearly regulated and 26 % EU countries not allowed direct request to OSPs



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## EUROPEAN JUDICIAL CYBERCRIME NETWORK



- ▶ **WHO WE ARE :**
- ▶ Network of Judicial Authorities specialized in cybercrime and digital evidence
- ▶ Contact Points in EU Member States plus Norway, Switzerland and Serbia
- ▶ Established by the Council Conclusions of 9 June 2016
- ▶ Hosted and supported by Eurojust

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## EUROPEAN JUDICIAL CYBERCRIME NETWORK



- ▶ **OUR MISSION IN CYBERCRIME AND E-EVIDENCE:**
- ▶ Provide access and disseminate information
- ▶ Provide a forum for discussions of practical and legal problems
- ▶ Exchange information on domestic legislation, relevant case law, international cooperation and best practices
- ▶ Promote the use of Eurojust in cross-border cases

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## EUROPEAN JUDICIAL CYBERCRIME NETWORK



- ▶ **OUR ACTIVITIES:**
- ▶ Two Plenary Meetings per year for expert practitioners
- ▶ Develop expertise in Subgroups of Data Retention, Digital Evidence, Virtual Currencies, Training
- ▶ Contribute to deliverables of stakeholders and produce our own on encryption, digital evidence, virtual currencies...
- ▶ Participate in training activities

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## EUROPEAN JUDICIAL CYBERCRIME NETWORK



- ▶ **HOW WE CAN SUPPORT YOU:**
- ▶ Be a Forum where you can discuss questions with colleagues
- ▶ Put you in contact with a colleague from the jurisdiction you need to work with
- ▶ Help you give your case an international perspective for possible extension to other jurisdictions
- ▶ Share the knowledge of relevant products for your case

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## EUROPEAN JUDICIAL CYBERCRIME NETWORK



The international case perspective – Are you alone ?

Probably not...

Criminals did not act alone neither should you

**RANSOMWARE**

**CYBERVIOLENCE**

**ONLINE INVESTMENT FRAUD**

**BOTNETs**

**VIRTUAL CURRENCY MONEY LAUNDERING**



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## Challenges in Cybercrime Investigations



### CYBERCRIME - DIGITAL EVIDENCE

LEGAL	BOTH	TECHNICAL
Data retention regimes	Encryption	Transfer of data
Admissibility	Chain of Custody	Seizure of large amounts of data
Jurisdiction	Seizure of Virtual Currencies	
	Victim Remediation	
	Rights of 3 <sup>rd</sup> parties	

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## Challenges in Cybercrime Investigations



### New technology - Old laws

How to apply old laws made under the concept of physical objects to digital objects ?

Fast paced evolution of Tech – need for training and constant updates

### The Future?

New roles and mind-set on how to present digital evidence and analyse its admissibility

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## Challenges to Cybercrime Investigations



### ► CASE EXAMPLE – Domestic Violence

The victim is threatened, bikini pictures and full contacts of her for sexual encounters are shared in a fake Facebook profile.

Police tracks the IP Address of one of the messages to an address shared by the suspect and his grandmother. Suspect denies facts. Times of the messages and posts coincide with the time suspect alleges to be playing football with a brother.

Brother confirms his version.

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## Challenges in Cybercrime Investigations



### ► CASE EXAMPLE – Corruption

A MP is investigated for corruption, as a suspect of receiving an apartment to get approval for a legislation benefiting company X. In a search to his personal computer, e-mails and documents stored in the “cloud” were seized. They portrait conversations with an executive of X about the apartment and 3D models to decorate it.

On trial, the MP denies being the owner of the apartment and claims Police manipulated the e-mails.

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## Challenges in Cybercrime Investigations



- ▶ COOPERATION WITH OSPs
- ▶ DATA RETENTION
- ▶ UNDERSTANDING E-EVIDENCE – TRAINING
- ▶ LOSS OF LOCATION
- ▶ DIRECT CROSS BORDER ACCESS TO DIGITAL EVIDENCE
- ▶ EXTENDED SEARCHES
- ▶ CHAIN OF CUSTODY

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## DIGITAL EVIDENCE



STORED E-EVIDENCE	
BASIC SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION - BSI	Information on the identity of the subscriber/user, address, IP address of the first login, billing and payment information, any other information on the site of the installation of communication equipment, how long the service has been used. Art. 18. n. 3 Budapest Convention
TRAFFIC DATA – NON CONTENT DATA	Any computer data relating to a communication indicating the communication's origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service – ex. IP or MAC addresses (metadata), access logs, transaction logs. Art. 1. al. d) Budapest Convention
CONTENT DATA	Body or text contained in the communication, such as an e-mail, post, image, video...
REAL TIME GATHERING OF E-EVIDENCE	
TRAFFIC DATA	Interception of who the suspect is contacting and where from – ex. with reference to IP addresses. Art. 20. Budapest Convention
CONTENT DATA	Interception of the body or text contained in the communication, e-mail text, post, image, video... Art. 21. Budapest Convention

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## DIGITAL EVIDENCE



**TRUE** complete **RELIABLE** credible

## PROPORCIONATE

Investigation vs. fundamental rights of the suspect

Supported by a **STANDARTZIED** forensic report

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## DIGITAL EVIDENCE SEARCH AND SEIZURE



- ▶ **Traditional search** tangible form
- ▶ LEA search the location, inspect and seize documents or objects during procedure

### HOW IS THIS DIFERENT WITH E-EVIDENCE ?

- ▶ Intangible form
- ▶ May be stored in a different location of the device but readily accessible to that system.

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## DIGITAL EVIDENCE



- ▶ **Stored on the suspect's device in our jurisdiction**
- ▶ Seizure and forensic analysis accordingly to national law
- ▶ **Stored on server property of third-party abroad or unknown location**

OSINT, MLA, EIO, voluntary cooperation of SPs in their legal framework and their own compliance rules

### CHAIN OF CUSTODY – FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

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## The Future ? Blockchain ?



### What Is Blockchain Technology?

**Immutable & Distributed**



Blockchain technology could provide a platform for chain of custody assurance along the investigation and trial, in a trustworthy easy to consult format.

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## MAIDAN SQUARE MASSACRE CASE

The 2014 EUROMAIDAN took the life of more than 100 people in Ukraine.  
More than 100 protesters were allegedly shot by police and snipers loyal to the Government.



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## MAIDAN SQUARE MASSACRE CASE

- ▶ 3 D Modelling of events to analyse conflicting narratives
- ▶ 65 hours of video, surveys, autopsy reports
- ▶ Spatial (3D) and temporal (4D) reconstruction of the event
- ▶ Interactive presentation platform with evidence, analysis, reconstruction animations and an archive of geolocated and synchronized source videos

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## EUROPEAN JUDICIAL CYBERCRIME NETWORK



- ▶ **Resources:**
- ▶ **European Judicial Cybercrime Network**  
<https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/judicial-cooperation/practitioner-networks/european-judicial-cybercrime-network>
- ▶ **Digital Evidence Situation Report**  
<https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/sirius-eu-digital-evidence-situation--report>
- ▶ **Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights**  
[https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide\\_art\\_6\\_criminal\\_eng.pdf](https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf)
- ▶ **Locard Project**  
<https://locard.eu/faqs>
- ▶ **Euromaidan 3D Reconstruction**  
<https://www.cmu.edu/chrs/cases/euromaidan.html>

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## EUROPEAN JUDICIAL CYBERCRIME NETWORK



More than half of all criminal investigations today include a request for access to e-evidence such as texts, emails or messaging apps. In response to the growing need for transnational access to digital evidence, Europol, in close collaboration with Eurojust, created the SIRIUS Project in October 2017.

The project is a platform that helps **judicial authorities** address complexity and volume of information online, providing guidance, tools and exchange of peer experiences.

**REGISTER**



SCAN ME

<https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/runner/Sirius>

Password : SIRIUS

For more information contact [sirius.eurojust@eurojust.europa.eu](mailto:sirius.eurojust@eurojust.europa.eu)

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## Online Investigations and the Challenges for the Defence

Co-funded by the Justice Programme of the European Union 2014-2020

**Aliant Law**

Muthupandi Ganesan  
Barrister-at-Law  
19 October 2021, Prague


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## This presentation will cover

-  Capturing evidence from the Internet: Open sources and Covert
-  Importance of chain custody in handling the evidence
-  Trial considerations: Methods of presentation and admissibility test

2


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**NPCC Guidance on Open Source Investigation / Research**

**ACPO – Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence – March 2012**

**ACPO - Good practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence (v4.0)**

7

## General principles

The general principles to be followed by investigators in handling and examining digital material are:

- (i) No action taken by investigators or their agents should change data held on a computer or storage media which may subsequently be relied upon in court;
- (ii) In circumstances where a person finds it necessary to access original data held on computer or storage media, that person must be competent to do so and be able to give evidence explaining the relevance and implications of their actions;
- (iii) An audit trail or other record of all processes applied to computer based electronic evidence should be created and preserved. An independent third party should be able to examine those processes; and,
- (iv) d. The person in charge of the investigation has overall responsibility for ensuring that the law and these principles are followed.

(Attorney General's Guidelines on Disclosure: For investigators, prosecutors and defence practitioners – December 2013 but updated March 2018)

8

## Digital evidence – International Issues

59. The obligations under the CPIA Code to pursue all reasonable lines of enquiry apply to material held overseas.

60. Where it appears that there is relevant material, the Prosecutor must take reasonable steps to obtain it, either informally or making use of the powers contained in the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 and any EU and International Conventions. See CPS Guidance 'Obtaining Evidence and Information from Abroad'.

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## Types of guidance

- CPS Guidance 'Obtaining Evidence and Information from Abroad
- Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (section 23(1)) Code of Practice
- Mutual Legal Assistance
- Extradition

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## Disclosure – Practical Issues

- Volume of Data
- Funding
- Equipment
- TRAINING:
  - For Judges, Prosecutors, Defence Lawyers and Clients
- NATURE OF EVIDNECES:
  - CCTV, Text messages, Social Networking, Exchange of Data, WhatsApp messages

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The screenshot shows the front page of The Telegraph news website. The main headline reads: "Almost 50 court cases dropped in six weeks because of issues with disclosure, CPS reveals". Below the headline is a photograph of a judge in black robes sitting at a desk with a microphone. To the right of the main article is a "MORE STORIES" section with four numbered items:

- 1 Danny John-Jules's Strictly exit is nothing to do with bullying, and everything to do with skin...
- 2 Jeremy Corbyn criticised for wearing 'scruffy' anorak to Armistice Day service
- 3 Theresa May's Brexit choices are now tactical, not technical
- 4 What your heart rate is really trying to tell you

At the top of the page, there is a navigation bar with "HOME NEWS SPORT BUSINESS ALL SECTIONS" and a search bar. A Sainsbury's advertisement is visible on the left side of the page.

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Home UK News

## Nearly 50 rape, sex assault cases halted after mass disclosure failings discovered by police, DPP

Published from 8 Jun 2018 09:48  
 Edited from 7 Jun 2018 07:09 [Get short URL](#)



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to defense lawyers. As a result, the Director of Public Prosecutions has been slammed by MPs.

DPP Alison Saunders attended the Commons Justice Committee on Tuesday, facing off with MPs who accused her of failing to take action within the prosecutor's service.

Read more

Saunders said the prosecution's failure to disclose evidence in sex crime cases – including a case that nearly saw an innocent man, Liam Allan, jailed on 12 counts of rape and sexual assault after failing to a vexatious ex-girlfriend – admitted that the problem was systemic and due to "cultural failings".

She admitted that such failings had "been there for a long time," but said that she has now "accepted... that [scrutiny of disclosure] has been frankly too late in the process. It is about doing this as early as possible."

DPP Saunders was accused of failing to take adequate action by MPs on the Commons Justice Committee yesterday. Saunders hit back, telling the committee that she doesn't "think it was inadequate."

She added: "I think there were lots of improvements."

The Crown Prosecutors Service reviewed 3,637 cases across England and Wales that were live between January and mid-February. The CPS identified disclosure failings in 47 cases, all of which were halted. In five of those cases, issues with disclosure of evidence was the primary reason.

In the other 42 cases, there were additional reasons including communications data like text messages, emails, and social media being examined too late, a failure to get material from third parties such as medical or social services records; or new evidence emerging.

Read more

A total of 14 defendants were in custody when their cases were dropped due to the disclosure failings.

In response to questions from Chairman of the Committee Bob Neill, Saunders accepted that the DPP's failings were upsetting. Neill said that "disclosure has been a blight for too long" and as a result of the disclosure failings, people like Liam Allan could be wrongfully jailed.

"I feel every single failure. It is not something that we want," Saunders said, adding, "I believe that the initiatives we have put in place will make a difference."

The initiatives in question will include training for all 3,000 prosecutors in England and Wales, speeding up the process so that disclosure takes place much sooner and is reviewed regularly. Disclosure "champions" will also be placed in all crown courts.

I'm going to ruin his life lol: Teen 'rapist' latest victim of police disclosure failings

With rape trial collapses as Oxford student cleared of charges before trial

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## DISCLOSURE: QUALITY OF KNOWLEDGE : JUDGE VERSUS JURY

- Security & Authenticity of Data
- Accuracy
- Continuity
- Telephone Data / Telephone Master Data
- Presentation of Data to the Jury

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## EXPERT EVIDENCE IN DIGITAL / CLOUD COMPUTING

It should always be kept in mind that expert evidence is merely one tool to be used in proving a case. The danger in placing too much reliance on the findings of experts is demonstrated in a series of cases in relation to DNA analysis, where there was no other evidence against the accused save the presence of his DNA found at the scene of a crime. The Court of Appeal has emphasized that expert evidence can only be judged in the light of the other evidence in the case. In these cases, the absence of any other evidence, however limited, should have been fatal to the case being charged - see *R v Doheny & Adams* (1997) 1 Cr. App. R. 269 (at paragraph 372).

The dangers of an over-reliance on expert evidence without considering the significance of the other evidence in the case is a factor that prosecutors need to consider in reviewing any file presented by the police for advice and review.

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## Expert Witness

Section 30 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 & Criminal Procedure Rules – Part 33

1. Assistance to the Court
2. Relevant Expertise
3. Impartial
4. Evidence is reliable

**Definition of Expert Witness:** An expert witness is a witness who provides to the court a statement of opinion on any admissible matter calling for expertise by the witness and is qualified to give such an opinion.

**The Duty of an Expert Witness:** The duty of an expert witness is to provide independent assistance to the court by way of objective, unbiased opinion in relation to matters within their expertise. This is a duty that is owed to the court and overrides any obligation to the party from whom the expert is receiving instructions - see *R v Harris and others* [2005] EWCA Crim. 1980.

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## Expert evidence: Challenges

1. By an application to the judge (on a voir dire or at a case management hearing) to exclude expert evidence that is biased, unhelpful or unreliable evidence under section 78 PACE and R v Turner (1975) 60 Cr. App R. 80;
2. By an application to the judge to exclude expert evidence due to noncompliance with Criminal Procedure Rules;
3. By requesting that evidence be edited to remove comment on matters outside of expert's experience, or amended where conclusions are overstated;
4. By requesting the preparation of a joint expert's report may result in reports being amended to more accurately reflect the underlying science; or •
5. By testing the expert's hypothesis in cross examination to ensure it has been the subject of sufficient scrutiny and peer reviews. For example, in drink driving cases, where defence experts produce new and unproven claims about breath test machines suffering from "long blow" or "long purge". There is no accepted legal basis for either claim.

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## Expert evidence: expertise must be reviewed carefully!

The screenshot shows the Guardian website interface. At the top, there are navigation links for 'Support The Guardian', 'Subscribe', 'Find a job', 'Sign in', and 'Search'. Below this is a menu with categories: 'News', 'Opinion', 'Sport', 'Culture', 'Lifestyle', and 'More'. The main headline reads 'How police put their faith in the 'expert' witness who was a fraud'. The sub-headline states: 'Jim Bates joined the police database of qualified witnesses and was used in dozens of serious investigations - including into child pornography and a senior Met officer. Now, after revelations that he falsified his background, the CPS is reviewing the cases he handled'. The author is identified as 'Jamie Doward, home affairs editor'. The date is 'Sun 23 Mar 2008 00:23 GMT'. There are social media sharing icons for Facebook, Twitter, and Email. The article text begins with 'Failures in the vetting procedures used for expert witnesses have emerged after a court ruled that a computer analyst who helped train hundreds of police officers and gave evidence in scores of trials is a liar and a fraudster. The Crown Prosecution Service is now launching a review of a number of serious cases that drew on evidence supplied by Trevor James 'Jim' Bates, 67, a former television repair man, who has been found guilty of making a false written statement claiming he had a degree in electronic engineering, and perjury.'

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# Cybercrime Legislation

## Functions of cybercrime legislation

- ❑ **Setting clear standards of behaviour for the use of computer devices**
- ❑ **Deterring perpetrators and protecting citizens**
- ❑ **Enabling law enforcement investigations while protecting individual privacy**
- ❑ **Providing fair and effective criminal justice procedures**
- ❑ **Requiring minimum protection standards in areas such as data handling and retention**
- ❑ **Enabling cooperation between countries in criminal matters involving cybercrime and electronic evidence**

Muthupandi Ganesan, Barrister-at-Law,  
Trier, Germany, 25.9.17

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# Cyber crime legislation


- 1989 • Council of Europe - 'Expert Report on Computer-Related Crime'
- 2001 • Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime
- 2011 • Directive 2011/92/EU on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography
- 2013 • Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems.

Muthupandi Ganesan, Barrister-at-Law,  
Trier, Germany, 25.9.17

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
21



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**Questions?**

**Muthupandi Ganesan  
Barrister-at-Law  
Aliant Law**



Muthupandi Ganesan, Barrister-at-Law  
Aliant Law



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# E-Evidence Gathering in Czech Republic Theory and Practise

Pavel Zeman

General Prosecutor's Office

## E-Evidence

- Rapid development of electronic communications and technologies
- Legislation remains more or less the same as it was in times of no cybercrime
- “We are combating cybercrime in 21st century with weapons of 20th century“
- We try to apply procedural rules designed for collection of evidence in real world to e-evidence from virtual world
- Huge requirements for interpretation and application skills of law enforcement and justice
- Space of manoeuvre for defend lawyers
- Very often contradictory court decisions

## Term of E-Evidence in General

### Art. 89 CPC


- Evidence may be anything that can help to clarify the case, in particular testimonies of the accused and witnesses, expert opinions, items and documents relevant to the criminal proceedings, and examinations. Each party may find, present, or propose to produce evidence. The fact that the law enforcement authority did not find or request a piece of evidence is not grounds for rejecting such evidence.
- Evidence obtained by unlawful coercion or by threat of coercion may not be used in the proceedings except when used as evidence against the person that used coercion or threatened with coercion.


## E-Evidence

- Evidence definition in penal proceedings is rather simple
- Its application limitation is minimal-just for evidence obtained illicitly
- Defence tries to limit usage of individual evidence (or even to refuse its admission)-this issues are being handled in every bigger case
- In the past
  - Accused person usually said that he/she had been illicitly compelled to confession
- Nowadays
  - Crimes are more sophisticated thus police investigation must be more sophisticated and thus defence is more sophisticated trying to prove the illicit acquisition of evidence, especially e-evidence

## E-Evidence

- Very simply said: e-evidence is DATA
  - Thus DATA is an immaterial thing (for the purposes of this presentation)
- DATA in criminal proceedings is a source of certain information
- DATA originates in connection with the use of electronic devices, especially communication devices and they have different form
- For evidence purposes we often use e-evidence originated from human activity (documents, photos, videos, text messages)=DOCUMENTS
- METADATA
  - Side product of DOCUMENT creation
  - Its creation is automatic
  - More and more used as e-evidence





## Saved Content Data

- Big problem in CZ
- CZ does not have legislation for remote access to computer or for remote computer search
- We thus apply legislation which is primarily written for the surveillance of persons in real world (also here we need the court order)
  - With the help of remote access we usually receive data from email boxes
  - Not used for access to „clouds“ as we have doubts about its legality for this purpose
- Solution - New Penal Procedure

National Cyber and  
Information Security  
Agency

POLICE

INTELLIGENCE  
SERVICES

PROSECUTION  
SERVICE


National Cyber and  
Information Security  
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SERVICES

PROSECUTION  
SERVICE

COURT



## Cooperation Basic Elements

- TRUST
- WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE
- COMMUNICATION
  - Signal communication platform
  - Regular meetings of case staff (formal and informal coffee break discussions 😊 )
  - Regular meetings of chiefs
- SHARING OF INFORMATION
  - Well-timed alert of problems/cases (Signal platform)
- STRIVE FOR SOLUTIONS RATHER THAN TO SEARCH FOR OBSTACLES
- IMPROVISATION - every time legal

## Use of E-Evidence Obtained from Other Institutions

- NCISA
  - Law enforcement authorities and judiciary are allowed to use e-evidence secured by NCISA
- Intelligence Services
  - Reminiscence from the past – fear of misuse of intelligence services and their powers and information
  - Thus information from intelligence services must not be transferred as evidence
  - No possibility to obtain e-evidence from intelligence services!!!
  - Only provision of information
  - Various approaches in different countries

# Attribution

Attribution in cyberspace is the process of determining the perpetrator of a cyber attack which is a foreign state or behind which a foreign state stands.

This process has several levels:

1. Attack identification and information of other participants in the process
2. Securing and collecting evidence of an attack and performing analysis
3. Comparison of evidence and information found by all stakeholders and then identification of the perpetrator (attacking state)
4. Transmission of information to state authorities (politicians) entitled to decide on the use of information
5. Reaction

## Case “The Hospital of Brno“ Example of Bad Practise

- The case of ransomware attack the Hospital of Brno
- Qualified as blackmail (Art. 175 CC) and some other crimes
- The unknown perpetrator carried out a large ransomware attack on the computer system of a large university hospital in Brno
- This attack caused great damage
  - The entire information system of the hospital was paralyzed
  - Many patients had to be transferred to other hospitals
  - No one died just because of the care of the doctors and paramedics
  - More or less hospital returned 30 years back

## Case “The Hospital of Brno“ Example of Bad Practise

- The investigation shows that the attack was led by malware which was also used in other attacks in other countries in Europe
- At the beginning of the investigation (after the attack was detected), there was an incredible situation
- The Police President learned of the attack from the Interior Minister who heard the information on TV news
- The Head of the Police Cyber Unit learned of the situation from the Police President
- NCISA was already on the scene dealing with the hospital's IT department but no one informed the Police
- Before the Police arrived on the crime scene, the electronic evidence was almost destroyed

## Case “The Hospital of Brno“ Example of Bad Practise

- Only after the public prosecutor arrived on the crime scene, it was possible to coordinate the activities of the Police, NCISA and IT specialists from the hospital, prevent further damage and at the same time secure necessary electronic evidence
- This case is, regarding communication among stakeholders, one of the worst that has ever happened
- After this experience, all stakeholders have understood that cooperation is necessary

### III. The “LOCAL“ Case

- The crime of an unauthorised access to a computer system (Art. 230 CC)
- At the beginning of 2020, an unknown perpetrator hacked the system of the Ministry of Regional Development for evaluating and monitoring the management of subsidies from European funds
- This system is part of a critical information infrastructure under the Cyber Security Act
- The incident was reported to the Police by the NCISA unofficially but very quickly
- The Police immediately contacted the Ministry of Regional Development as a victim and data from the compromised system was secured

### III. The “LOCAL“ Case

- There are currently two investigative versions:
  - a) The perpetrator installed malware to use computers to extract the “Monero“ cryptocurrency
  - b) At the same time the perpetrator gained access to install malware to control software (Backdoor Notrobin)
- Further requests for data preservation were sent abroad and managed
- NCISA informed the Police and also performed an overall analysis of the hacked system for the Police
- Police is now waiting for the results of MLA requests from US and the Russian Federation, but all steps to identify the perpetrator have been taken in the Czech Republic

**Thank you for your attention**

